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A SPEECH OR DEBATE PRIVILEGE FOR STATE LEGISLATORS WHO
VIOLATE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS?
The concept of legislative independence in
speech or debate is thoroughly entrenched in
American political thought. Of common law
origin, the concept is now embodied in Article 1
§ 6 cl. la of the Federal Constitution which
specifically provides that "for any Speech or
Debate in either House [United States Senators
and Representatives] shall not be questioned in
any other place."' Most state constitutions have
similar provisions.2 However, although the
I Article I, Section 6 also provides members of
Congress with a separate privilege from arrest during
sessions of Congress.
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a
Compensation for their Services, to be ascer-
tained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of
the United States. They shall in all Cases, except
Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be
privileged from Arrest during their Attendence
at the Session of their respective Houses, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for
any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall
not be questioned in any other Place.
No Senator or Representative shall, during the
Time for which he was elected, be appointed to
any civil office under the Authority of the United
States, which shall have been created, or the
Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased
during such time; and no Person holding any
Office under the United States, shall be a Mem-
ber of either House during his Continuance in
Office.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
2 The Illinois constitutional provision is fairly typi-
cal:
A member [of the General Assembly] shall not be
held to answer before any other tribunal for any
speech or debate, written or oral, in either
House....
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 12.
Florida is the only state with no constitutional pro-
vision concerning legislative privilege of any kind.
The constitutions of California, Iowa, Mississippi,
Nevada and South Carolina provide only a privilege
from arrest. (CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 11; IowA CONST.
art. III, § 11; MIss. CONST. art. IV, § 48; Nzv.
CONST. art. IV, § 11; S.C. CONST. art. 3, § 14. North
Carolina gives legislators a right to protest action of
speech or debate privilege is an accepted part of
the American political tradition, difficult ques-
tions concerning its scope and meaning con-
tinue to arise in the process of applying the
privilege to the facts of specific cases.
One particularly complex question was raised
recently in United States v. Craig,3 a Seventh
Circuit case in which the court was asked to
determine to what extent, if any, state legislators
are protected by a speech or debate privilege in
federal criminal prosecutions. The legislators in
the Craig case were charged with violating the
Hobbs Act4 and the mail fraud statute' in their
conduct as state legislators. Had they been fed-
eral congressmen, a significant portion of the
Government's evidence against them would
have been barred by the federal speech or de-
bate clause. Had they been prosecuted by state
authorities for violation of a state law, the Illi-
nois constitutional speech or debate clause
6
would have had the same effect. The Craig
court, in essence, had to determine whether
this same evidence could be used against the
legislators simply because it was the federal
government that was prosecuting them for
commission of a federal crime. Thus far the
case has generated three different judicial
opinions on this question. The district court
held that the state legislators in question were
protected by the Illinois constitutional speech
or debate clause.7 On appeal, a majority of a
the legislature. (N.C. CONST. art. 2, § 18). A list of the
various state speech or debate clauses or similar pro-
visions can be found in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367, 375 n.5 (1951).
3 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir. 1976).
4 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970).
5 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
6 ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. IV, § 12.
The unpublished district court opinion and or-
ders were included in the brief for the United States
to the court of appeals. See, Brief for the United
States appendix A, B, C. 528 F.2d 773 (7th Cir. 1976).
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three judge panel of the court of appeals held
that they were entitled to a federal common law
speech or debate privilege." On rehearing,
however, a majority of the full court held that
no such federal common law speech or debate
privilege exists. The legislators were only pro-
tected by common law official immunity.9
This comment will review the Craig decisions
and the Supreme Court cases on which the
judges of the district and appellate courts re-
lied. While, as will be seen, there are no Su-
preme Court cases which speak directly to the
problems raised by a federal criminal prosecu-
tion of a state legislator, it is the thesis of this
comment that the third Craig opinion most ac-
curately reflects the law of privilege as the Su-




In 1974, Robert Craig, Thomas Hanahan,
and Louis Markert, members of the Illinois
House of Representatives, were indicted for
extortion and mail fraud. Count one of the
indictment charged them with obtaining $1500
from members of the Illinois Car and Truck
Renting and Leasing Association "under color
of official right" in violation of the Hobbs Act.'0
In count two they were charged with defraud-
ing the citizens of Illinois of their right to loyal
and honest representation "and their right to
have the legislative business of Illinois con-
ducted honestly by accepting $1500 to block the
passage of a bill which would affect the automo-
8 United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773 (7th Cir.
1976).
9 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir. 1976).
,0 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970).
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs,
delays, or affects commerce or the movement of
any article or commodity in commerce, by rob-
bery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to
do, or commits or threatens physical violence to
any person or property in furtherance of a plan
or purpose to do anything in violation of this
section shall be fined not more than $10,000, or
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
(b) As used in this section-
(2)The term "extortion" means the obtaining of
property from another, with his consent, in-
duced by wrongful use of actual or threatened
force, violence or fear, or under color of official
right....
bile leasing business. Their conduct was alleged
to violate the mail fraud statute."
Prior to the indictment, Markert had been
subpoened to testify before the grand jury in-
vestigating alleged corruption in the Illinois
General Assembly. He had also voluntarily sub-
mitted to interviews with United States postal
inspectors and with an Assistant United States
Attorney. On all occasions he was represented
by counsel and was informed of his fifth
amendment privilege against self incrimina-
tion. He chose, nevertheless, to answer all ques-
tions put to him during the investigation.
After the indictment, Markert moved to dis-
miss on the grounds that the federal and Illi-
nois speech or debate clauses' 2 constituted an
absolute bar to his prosecution. Although the
district court' 3 held that Markert was entitled to
the protection of the speech or debate clause of
the Illinois constitution,' 4 it concluded that the
scope of the clause was not so broad as to bar his
prosecution for the crimes of extortion and
mail fraud. The speech or debate privilege op-
erated as a substantive bar to prosecution only
if legislative acts were made the basis of a
charge or if inquiry into the legislative process
was a necessary and essential part of the prose-
cution." Noting that "extortion and mail fraud
11 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise
any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtain-
ing money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or prom-
ises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter,
give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or pro-
cure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious
coin, obligation, security, or other article, or any-
thing represented to be or intimated or held out
to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or
attempting so to do, places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any mat-
ter of thing whatever to be sent or delivered by
the Postal Service or takes or receives therefrom,
any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to
be delivered by mail according to the direction
thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to
be delivered by the person to whom it is ad-
dressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined
not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
11 See note 1 and note 2, supra.
13 The opinion is unpublished. See note 7 supra.
14 The court found that the federal speech or de-
bate clause protected only federal legislators. Brief
for the United States at app. 5.
"s Id. at app. 8. The court reached this conclusion
after an examination of United States v. Johnson, 383
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are in no conceivable way part of the legislative
process," and that the prosecution could pro-
ceed "without inquiry into the legislative proc-
ess," the court refused to dismiss the indict-
ment. 16
Markert then moved to have his pre-indict-
ment statements suppressed, claiming that they
were obtained in violation of the speech or
debate privilege. The court agreed that Mar-
kert was entitled to an evidentiary privilege to
the extent that the government attempted to
inquire into his motives for or actual perform-
ance of legislative acts, and it ordered the sup-
pression of certain portions of his testimony
before the grand jury. Some of his statements
to the postal inspectors and the Assistant
United States Attorney were suppressed as
well. In answer to the Government's argument
that Markert had waived his privilege by volun-
tarily making his statements, the court held that
the speech or debate privilege was not personal




The Government appealed the suppression
order,' asserting that the Illinois speech or
debate clause could not be invoked by Markert
because privilege under state law was inapplica-
ble in federal criminal prosecutions. Both Rule
26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
and Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
provide that privileges are to be controlled by
"the principles of common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience." 9 The Gov-
U.S. 169 (1966), and United States v. Brewster, 408
U.S. 501 (1971), cases in which the Supreme Court
reached a similar conclusion with regard to the scope
of the federal speech or debate clause. See discussion
accompanying notes 100-112 and notes 113-129 infra.
16 Brief for the United States at app. 8.
'7 Brief for the United States at app. 15. This hold-
ing on the question of waiver was subsequently re-
versed by the court of appeals panel decision, 528
F.2d 773, 780 (7th Cir. 1976). The opinion of the full
court, after rehearing, did not reach the issue of
waiver, 537 F.2d. 957, 958 (7th Cir. 1976). Because the
issue of waiver is tangential to the focus of this com-
ment, it will not be further discussed in the body of
the paper.
18 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970) allows the Government
to appeal interlocutory rulings on the suppression of
evidence.
" The language of both rules is essentially identical
except that Rule 501 contains an additional provision
ernment argued that no federal common law
speech or debate privilege existed, and that
neither "reason" nor "experience" counseled
the creation of such a privilege in this case.
20
A three judge panel of the Seventh Circuit,
with one judge concurring only in the result2'
agreed with the Government that under Rule
501 and Rule 26 "the admissibility of evidence in
criminal cases in federal courts is governed by
federal law and is not dependent upon diverse
state laws, including state constitutional provi-
sions. '22 The court, therefore, found that Mar-
kert could not invoke the protection of the
speech or debate clause of the Illinois Constitu-
tion.
The panel next considered whether Markert
was entitled to a federal common law speech or
debate privilege. 2 It briefly reviewed several
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
scope of the federal speech or debate privilege.
Those decisions, according to the panel major-
ity, indicate that the purpose of the federal
provision is to prevent legislators from being
threatened by prosecutions and convictions for
the performance of their legislative duties. To
insure this protection, the clause has both "sub-
stantive and evidentiary elements:" legislative
that state law is to govern privileges in civil cases in
which state law supplies the rule of decision.
20 In the alternative, the Government argued that
any privilege which did exist should be considered
personal and therefore waivable by the individual
legislator. Brief for the United States at 36.
21 528 F.2d 773 (7th Cir. 1976). Judge Cummings
wrote the majority opinion for himself and Judge
Kunzig, Judge of the United States Court of Claims
sitting by designation. Judge Tone, whose position
differed substantially from that of the other two
members of the panel, wrote a separate, concurring
opinion which is discussed in the text accompanying
notes 39-46 infra.
22 528 F:2d at 776.
2' The court did not discuss whether the federal
speech or debate clause protects state legislators. One
Fourth Circuit case, Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d
225, 228 (4th Cir. 1973), suggests that the Supreme
Court extended the federal clause to the states in
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 376 (1951). However,
such a suggestion seems clearly wrong. The Supreme
Court does not even consider Tenney a speech or
debate clause case. United States v. Brewster, 408
U.S. 501, 516 n.10 (1972). Furthermore, no constitu-
tional vehicle such as the fourteenth amendment ex-
ists by which an article, rather than an amendment,
of the Constitution can be made binding on the states,
and Article I, § 6 on its face applies only to the
Federal Congress. See, Brief for the United States at
15 n.32.
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acts cannot be made the basis of civil or criminal
liability, and legislators cannot be made to an-
swer questions about either their legislative ac-
tivities or their motives for performing those
activities.2 4 Only the evidentiary aspect of the
privilege was before the panel. The majority
characterized it as a "necessary prophylatic 25
and maintained that its purpose was "the same
as that of the substantive aspect of the Speech
or Debate Clause: preservation of the inde-
pendence of the legislature."2
The Government argued, however, that in-
dependence of the legislature is only a concern
when co-equal branches of the government are
involved. At the federal level, the speech or
debate clause serves a separation of powers
purpose, "preserving the balance of power
among the three co-equal branches of govern-
ment.."27 Because the federal government was
prosecuting a state official in the instant case,
there was no question of "intra-federal power"
being upset:
The power to prosecute [Markert and the other
legislators] . . . evolved from the co-equal func-
tioning of all three federal branches. Congress
... passed the laws on which the prosecution
rests; the executive ... elected to pursue the
case; and the judiciary awaits to hear it.
28
The real issue, according to the Government,
was whether failure to recognize a legislative
privilege for state legislators in federal court
would interfere with a legitimate state interest,
since under a federal system of government
national interests may not be protected "in ways
that . . . unduly interfere with the legitimate
activities of the states. '29 Although admitting
that states clearly have an interest in free legis-
lative debate, the Government argued that ab-
sence of legislative privilege would not hamper
that free debate. It maintained that the protec-
tion of the first amendment and the doctrine of
official immunity would insure freedom of
speech in state legislatures:
The first amendment, as interpreted today, pro-
tects all citizens from criminal prosecution on
24 528 F.2d at 777.25 Id. at 778.
26 Id.
27 Brief for the United States at 29.
2 8 
Id.
29 Id. at 30, quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
44 (1971).
the basis of the type of political expression which
gave rise to the doctrine of Speech or Debate.
Absent separation of powers considerations,
there is no corresponding benefit to be gained
from extending the privilege beyond the ambit
of first amendment protections.
To the extent that the first amendment would
not immunize state legislators from civil suits for
libel and slander, the doctrine of official immu-
nity would provide the necessary protection.30
Furthermore, the Government argued, the
states have a legitimate interest in obtaining
federal assistance in the area of crime control,
and that interest would be furthered "by the
federal government's attempt to use its re-
sources to assist in excising the malignancy of
local political corruption." 3'
The panel majority felt strongly that the gov-
ernment's position ignored the basic concept of
federalism envisioned by the drafters of the
Constitution: the national government was de-
signed to be one of limited powers and the
states were to continue as essential units of gov-
ernment.32 According to the two judge major-
ity, state legislators have as vital a role to play in
the government of a state as Congress has in the
government of the nation. Independence of
the state legislatures cannot, therefore, be dis-
missed as irrelevant.
Although the speech or debate privilege em-
braces notions of the separation of powers
among co-equal branches of government, its pri-
30 Brief for the United States at 32 n.64. For its first
amendment argument the Government relied on
Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966), in which the
Supreme Court said:
The manifest function of the First Amendment
in a representative government requires that leg-
islators be given the widest latitude to express
their views on issues of policy.
385 U.S. at 136. This case is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 198-205 infra.
"' Brief for the United States at 32.
32 The majority used the tenth amendment to but-
tress this argument: "The reservation of power for
the states is .. . the import of the Tenth Amend-
ment .. " 528 F.2d at 778. Yet it is clear today, as
one commentator has noted, that "the Tenth Amend-
ment does not shield the States nor their political
subdivisions from the import of any authority affirm-
atively granted to the Federal Government." E. COR-
WIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS To-
DAY, 372-73 (1974). Thus, if the federal government
has the power to reach the conduct of the legislators,
the tenth amendment does not take away that power
simply because its exercise interferes with the state's
own exercise of power.
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mary message is that legislatures must be able to
discharge their lawful responsibility in an atmos-
phere free from the threat of interference by
other governmental units. A legislator in consid-
ering whether to support or oppose a proposed
law must be free to reflect on the merits; he must
not be deterred from advocating a position by
the threat of prosecution by a hostile executive.
The evil is the fact of deterrence; whether the
threat emanates from the local or national exec-
utive makes no difference.
This threat to the legislature's independence
is fundamentally inconsistent with the idea of
legislative action reflected in the policy, purpose
and history of the privilege and inherent in the
words: "for any Speech or Debate in either
House, they shall not be questioned in any other
Place." U.S. CONST. art. I § 6. Deterring a legis-
lator from advancing a point of view, or influ-
encing how he votes by requiring him to explain
his motives before a grand jury is precisely the
evil the speech or debate privilege intends to
preventY'
Protection of the first amendment was not
enough because the amendment provides no
privilege against giving testimony, even if that
testimony involves inquiry into a legislator's
motive for a particular vote or other legislative
act.3 4 Consequently, "in view of the purposes of
the speech or debate privilege, its common law
history, and the important role of the states in
governing the country," the majority concluded
that state legislators are protected in federal
criminal prosecutions by a federal common law
speech or debate privilege.3 5 The panel did
leave open the possibility that the privilege
might be abrogated by Congress in a narrowly
drawn statute,36 but it was unwilling to "abol-
ish"37 the privilege by "judicial fiat in a federal
criminal prosecution under a statute of general
applicability."3
33 528 F.2d at 778-79.34 Id. at 779.
3 Id.
36 The court's position was similar to that of the
Court in United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169
(1966), in which the issue of whether inquiry might be
made into the legislative acts of Federal Congressmen
in a prosecution under a narrowly drawn statute
passed by Congress in the exercise of its power to
regulate congressional conduct was expressly left
open.
3 528 F.2d at 779.
38 528 F.2d at 779. Although the majority held that
Markert was protected by a federal common law
speech or debate evidentiary privilege, it remanded
the case with directions to overrule the suppression
Judge Tone, concurring in the result,39
agreed that the Illinois constitutional speech or
debate clause was inapplicable in federal
criminal prosecutions. But he disputed the
panel majority's position that a legislator could
claim a similar privilege under federal common
law. Citing the same cases as the majority, he
maintained that while state legislators are enti-
tled to protection from liability for acts per-
formed in furtherance of their legislative du-
ties, the basis of that protection is not the fed-
eral speech or debate clause, but the common
law doctrine of official immunity.40 As for the
evidentiary privilege, Judge Tone asserted that
any privilege against disclosure must be "com-
mensurate" with the underlying immunity
from liability. But,
where there is no immunity, it would be incon-
gruous if not useless, to recognize an evidentiary
privilege. Accordingly, whether the claimed priv-
ilege should be recognized as a development in
the federal common law of evidence depends on
whether there is an underlying immunity.
41
He then pointed out that the doctrine of official
immunity has never been extended into the
area of criminal liability:
Immunity from civil but not criminal liability has
been regarded as sufficient to achieve the pur-
pose of the doctrine of official immunity, which
is to promote independence and fearless dis-
charge of duty on the part of the protected
officials .
42
Therefore, according to Judge Tone, state leg-
islators are subject to federal criminal liability if
they violate a federal criminal statute, even if
they are acting within their legislative role.
On the other hand, federal congressmen
are afforded considerably broader protection
by the federal speech or debate clause because
it not only promotes independence but serves
order. Both Judge Cummings and Judge Kunzig felt
that the legislative privilege was a "personal" privi-
lege of the legislator and that Markert, by volun-
tarily testifying, had waived his protection. Id. at
780-81.
39 Id. at 781. Judge Tone concurred on the basis of
the reversal of the suppression order.40 Id. at 782.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 783.
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"an additional more fundamental purpose
grounded in the separation of powers in the
federal government."43 Seeing no separation of
powers problem in the prosecution of a state
legislator by the federal executive ,44 and noting
that the Federal Constitution itself "does not
create an immunity for state legislators"
4 5
Judge Tone maintained there was no reason
for the federal judiciary to create such an im-
munity.
Nothing in our history or in the authorities re-
lied upon by the court in this case suggests that
there is a threat of federal executive interfer-
ence with the independence of state legislatures
that would warrant extending the judicially de-
veloped doctrine of official immunity beyond its
traditional boundaries. Accordingly, I would
hold that the state legislator's official immunity
does not extend to liability under federal crimi-
nal statutes, and that he therefore has no com-
mensurate official privilege against disclosure.
46
The Full Court Decision
The Government petitioned the court for a
rehearing en banc. A majority47 of the full court
agreed with Judge Tone's position and voted to
reverse the panel decision that the legislators
were entitled to the protection of a federal com-
mon law evidentiary speech or debate privi-
lege. 48 The court made special note, however,
that
the absence of a privilege has no relationship to
the proof necessary to establish a crime involv-
43Id.
44 The relationship between the states and the fed-
eral government is not usually characterized as a
separation of powers question. See Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 564-65 (1967): "The doctrine of separation
of powers is, of course, applicable only to the rela-
tions of coordinate branches of the same govern-
ment, not to the relations between the branches of the
Federal Government and those of the States." Cf.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962), "[lit is the
relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate
branches of the Federal Government, and not the
federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which
gives rise to the 'political question.'
45 528 F.2d at 783.
46 Id. (footnotes omitted).
47 Judges Pell, Sprecher, Tone, Bauer and Wood
made up the majority.
48 537 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1976). The opinion of the
full court does not re-analyze the issue, but merely
adopts Judge Tone's concurring opinion from the
panel decision.
ing official corruption; and that although a legis-
lator's voting record and other legislative con-
duct is not privileged from inquiry it would not,
standing alone, support an inference of wrong-
doing or improper motive. Proof aliunde will be
required .49
Three judges disagreed with the majority on
the issue of privilege.
58 Judge Cummings and
Judge Swygert felt the legislators were pro-
tected by a federal common law privilege.
5'
Chief Judge Fairchild, on the other hand, felt
that because of the "constitutional relationship
between the states and the United States," the
court should honor and give effect to the
speech or debate clause of the Illinois Constitu-
tion .
2
THE COMPETING THEORIES: SPEECH OR
DEBATE PRIVILEGE VERSUS OFFICIAL
IMMUNITY
As the court of appeals panel decision makes
clear, the decision to fashion a common law
speech or debate privilege rather than apply
the Illinois state constitutional privilege is dic-
tated by the federal rules of evidence. In terms
of practical effect on the legislators in Craig,
however, there is little difference in result. Al-
though there has been no definitive interpreta-
tion of the Illinois provision, it is worded almost
identically to the federal constitutional provi-
sion and there is no reason to suppose that the
Illinois courts would not closely follow the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the federal
clause. Similarly, those same Supreme Court
decisions which interpret the federal clause ex-
amine the origin of the concept of legislative
privilege, and naturally provide an authorita-
tive source for determining the parameters of a
common law speech or debate privilege.
49 537 F.2d at 958-59 (emphasis in original).
" There was less disagreement on the question of
whether the suppression order should be reversed.
Seven of the eight judges voted for reversal on that
issue.
51judge Cummings adhered to his views in the
panel majority opinion that the legislators were pro-
tected by a federal common law speech or debate
privilege; but that Markert had waived his privilege
by voluntarily testifying. Judge Swygert agreed with
Judge Cummings on the existence of the privilege,
but he felt the privilege had not been waived. 537
F.2d at 958-59.
5 1 Id. at 959. Chief judge Fairchild voted to reverse
the suppression order, however, because he felt Mar-
kert had waived the privilege.
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On the other hand, of crucial importance to
the legislators in Craig is the question of
whether the "principles of common law" and
relevant Supreme Court decisions dictate the
application of a privilege based on the speech
or debate clauses of the federal and state consti-
tutions, or one based on the similar but nar-
rower principles underlying the doctrine of of-
ficial immunity. Developing an answer to this
question involves an understanding of the Eng-
lish common law origin of the privilege, its
Americanization as it was incorporated into the
constitutional structure of the United States,
and its relationship to the common law doctrine
of official immunity.
Development of the Speech or Debate Privilege
The concept of legislative privilege in speech
or debate was brought to the United States
from England where it had developed as a con-
sequence of the long struggle for political su-
premacy between the Crown and Parliament.
5 3
The English battle was two pronged. Parlia-
ment had to fight not only for freedom of
speech and deliberation, but also for the right
to initiate legislation.5 4 Particularly during the
reign of the Tudors and the Stuarts, the Crown
resisted the growth of Parliamentary power.
Throughout this period members of Parlia-
ment were subject to arrest, imprisonment or
banishment from Parliament both for speeches
which displeased the Crown and for "meddling
with matters of state" which were considered to
be the sole perogative of the Crown.
55
Parliament responded to actions taken
against its members by passing legislation de-
claring that all prosecutions based on parlia-
mentary proceedings were void," and by claim-
' United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178
(1966).
54 Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legisla-
tive and Executive Proceedings, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 131,
132 (1910) [hereinafter cited as Veeder].
" Id. at 132-33. See also Celia, The Doctrine of Legis-
lative Privilege of Freedom of Speech and Debate: Its Past,
Present and Future as a Bar to Criminal Prosecutions in the
Courts, 2 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1, (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Cella].
" See e.g., Privilege of Parliament Act 1512, 4 Hen.
VIII, c.8. This Act arose out of the prosecution of
Richard Strode, a member of the House of Com-
mons, for introducing legislation to regulate tin min-
ing. Although the Act clearly stated that prosecutions
of all present and future members of Parliament for
legislative acts were void, the Kings Bench later held
ing, in petitions to the Crown at the beginning
of each Parliament, that freedom of speech was
its "ancient and undoubted right and inherit-
ance."5 7 The Ehglish monarchs yielded to this
assertion of privilege in varying degrees. Eliza-
beth I, for example, apparently acknowledged
"freedom of speech," but tried to qualify the
privilege by defining it as the privilege to say
"aye or no."58 James I was also willing to recog-
nize the existence of a privilege, but not as a
parliamentary right. He maintained that any
parliamentary privilege was a matter of royal
"toleration" and that the King was therefore
free, should the need arise, to "punish any
man's misdemeanors in Parliament, as well
during their sitting as after."59 However, by the
middle of the seventeenth century, Parliament
appears to have won the battle for a complete
and meaningful privilege. The privilege was
embodied formally into the English Bill of
Rights in 1689,60 and its existence was never
seriously questioned thereafter. 6' Subse-
quently, as the battle for political supremacy
between the Crown and Parliament was re-
solved, the privilege came to be asserted more
often against fellow citizens than against the
King.62 In its origin, however, the privilege was
clearly asserted to assure the independence of
Parliament from the power of the Crown.
The English Parliament's concern for inde-
pendence was, of course, well known to those
that the Act was "private" and referred only to
Strode. In 1667, Parliament formally declared the Act
to be one of "general operation" declaring "ancient
and necessary rights and privileges of Parliament."
Veeder, supra note 54, at 132 n.5, 133-34.
-1 Veeder, supra note 54, at 132-33. Assertion of
the privilege in the petition to the Crown was appar-
ently begun in 1541. Id. at 132.
58 Id. at 133. Veeder quotes the Queen as saying:
Privilege of speech is granted, but you must
know what privilege you have; not to speak
everyone what he listeth or what cometh in his
brain to utter that; but your privilege is, aye or
no.
59 Id.
o Id. at 134. See also Comments on Recent Cases, 50
IOWA L. REV. 893, 895 (1965). For a detailed discus-
sion of the development of the English privilege, see
Celia, supra note 55, at 1-13, and M. CLARKE, PARLI-
MENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES, 1-
13 (1943) [hereinafter cited as CLARKE].
61 Although the existence of the privilege was set-
tled, its scope was still the subject of considerable
debate. Cella, supra note 55, at 12.
2 Comments on Recent Cases, 50 IOWA L. REV. 893,
895 (1965).
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who founded the English colonies in America.
Early colonial legislators expressed a similar
concern for the independence of the colonial
assemblies,63 and the tensions that developed
between the assemblies and the royal governors
and English Parliament served to keep that
concern alive throughout the colonial period.6
From a legal standpoint none of the colonial
assemblies possessed formally recognized par-
liamentary rights. 6 But, starting quite early in
the colonial period, they began to ask the royal
governors to recognize that they held privileges
similar to those enjoyed by Parliament,6 6 and
gradually the custom of recognizing and grant-
ing legislative privilege to the colonial assem-
blies became thoroughly established. 67 Indeed,
there is every indication that the colonists felt
such privileges to be a matter of "right" which
could not be denied.
68
Immediately after the revolution, the Articles
of Confederation 69 and the constitutions of sev-
eral states70 formally recognized the existence
6' Celia, supra note 55, at 13; CLARKE, supra note
60, at 13.
64 See CLARKE, supra note 60, at 90-131, for an
excellent summary of some of the battles between the
royal governors and the assemblies. As both Clarke
and Cella make clear, the question of legislative inde-
pendence was more complex in the colonies, since
colonial assemblies were confronted not only with the
power of the royal governors, but also with the power
of the English Parliament. Celia, supra note 56, at 14;
CLARKE, supra note 61, at 12. Many colonists appar-
ently felt they owed no loyalty or duty to Parliament,
their only obligation being to the King. W. BENNET,
AMERICAN THEORIES OF FEDERALISM, at 15-37 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as BENNET]. Parliament, of course,
had other ideas.
65 CLARKE, supra note 60, at 12.
66 Id. at 61-92.
67 Id. at 70.
6 1 Id. at 79.
69 ART. OF CONFED. V.
Freedom of Speech and Debate in Congress shall
not be impeached or questioned in any court or
place out of Congress.
70 MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. VIII,
(1776):
Freedom of speech and debates or proceedings,
in the legislature, ought not to be impeached in
any other court or judicature.
MASS. CONST. art. XXI (1780):
The freedom of deliberation speech and debate
in either house of the legislature, is so essential to
the rights of the people that it cannot be the
foundation of any accusation or prosecution, ac-
tion, or complaint in any other court or place
whatsoever.
N.H. CONST. art. XXX (1784):
and importance of legislative privilege in the
representative systems they sought to establish.
A few years later, the drafters of the Federal
Constitution did not even question the impor-
tance of legislative privilege. They adopted the
federal speech or debate clause without dissent
or significant discussion," merely altering the
wording of the English privilege to fit the
American tripartite governmental structure.
72
As Justice Frankfurter was later to note, the
clause was simply a "reflection of political prin-
ciples already established in the states. 73 Those
"principles already established" were not, how-
ever, adopted wholesale from England. Al-
though the colonial assemblies had, in some
sense, begun their existence as "small parlia-
ments," 74 the nature of the political structure in
the colonial system, the physical isolation of the
colonies from England, and the intense debate
over the nature of government that raged
throughout the colonial period75 all combined
to create uniquely American institutions in the
colonies.
Scope of the Privilege
The first judicial consideration of the scope
of legislative privilege in America appears in
Coffin v. Coffin,7 6 an 1808 case in which the
Massachusetts Supreme Court was asked to in-
terpret the meaning of the state constitutional
speech or debate clause. 77 Interestingly, the
case presented no issue of executive interfer-
ence with the legislative branch, the evil the
The freedom of deliberation, speech, and debate
in either house of the legislature, is so essential to
the rights of the people, that it cannot be the
foundation of any action, complaint, or prosecu-
tion, in any other court or place whatsoever.
71 Celia, supra note 55, at 14. Two amendments to
the clause were offered and rejected. One would have
made each house the sole judge of the privilege, the
other would have defined the extent of the privilege.
Id. at 14-15.
72 The English privilege is phrased as follows:
[Tihat the freedom of Speech and Debate or
Proceedings in Parliament ought not to be im-
peached or questioned in any court or place out
of Parliament.
1 Win. + M., sess. 2, c.2.
7' Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951).
7 CLARKE, supra note 60, at 12.
7 See BENNET, supra note 64 passim; and CLARKE,
supra note 60, passim.
76 4 Mass. 1 (1808). This case is discussed in great
detail in Celia, supra note 55, at 19-30.
71 MASS. CONST. art. XXI (1780). See note 70supra
for text of provision.
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privilege was originally designed to remedy.
Rather, it involved a private citizen's suit for
slander against a state legislator.
78
William Coffin asked Benjamin Russell, a
member of the Massachusetts House of Repre-
sentatives, to introduce a resolution to increase
the number of notaries public in Nantucket.
Russell, an acquaintance of Coffin's, agreed.
After the resolution passed, and the House had
moved on to the consideration of other busi-
ness, Micajah Coffin,79 another representative,
asked the sponsor of the resolution to identify
the "respectable gentlemen from Nantucket"
from whom he had received the information on
which he had based the proposal. William Cof-
fin was pointed out and Micajah Coffin was
heard to exclaim, "What! That Convict?" and
other words to the effect that an acquittal from
bank robbery charges against William did not
"make him any less guilty."8 0 William then sued
Micajah for slander.
Micajah raised the Massachusetts constitu-
tional provision as a defense and argued, citing
English precedents, that the effect of the clause
was to make the Massachusetts House the sole
judge of the privileges of its members. William
Coffin, on the other hand, argued that the
English experience was simply inapposite. The
House could not be the sole judge of its own
privileges under the Massachusetts constitu-
tional form of government in which "the judici-
ary power is an original coordinate and inde-
pendent branch of the government,"8' and the
court is established "as the supreme tribunal to
determine the true meaning of each part of the
constitution, as well as of the laws."8' 2
ChiefJustice Parsons, who wrote the opinion
of the Court, agreed with William Coffin.
While he was willing to concede that for "cer-
tain intents and purposes"s3 the House might
78 At least one commentator has suggested that
legislative privilege incorporated in the constitutions
of the states was designed primarily as protection
against fellow citizens of the legislator. Field, The
Constitutional Privileges of Legislators, 9 MINN. L. REV.
442, 443 (1924-25). However, in view of the fact that
the governmental structure of the states so closely
parallels that of the federal government, it is proba-
ble that the constitutional clauses were intended to
serve a separation of powers purpose as well.
7' Micahah and William Coffin were not related.
s4 4 Mass. at 4.
Id. at 13.
8
2 !d. at 9.
3Id. at 31.
be the exclusive judge of its privileges, he felt
the court at least had the right and obligation to
determine the "intent and design"8' 4 of the con-
stitutional clause and whether it comprehended
the particular conduct of the legislator. He then
proceded to interpret the clause expansively, in
words that are still quoted today.
85
[Legislative privilege is secured] not with the
intention of protecting the members against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to sup-
port the rights of the people, by enabling their
representatives to execute the functions of their
office without fear of prosecutions, civil or crim-
inal. I therefore think that the article ought not
to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the
full design of it may be answered. I will not
confine it to delivering an opinion, uttering a
speech, or haranguing in debate; but will extend
it to the giving of a vote, to the making of a
written report, and to every other act resulting
from the nature and in the execution, of the
office; and I would define the article as securing
to every member exemption from prosecution,
for every thing said or done by him, as a repre-
sentative, in the exercise of the functions of that
office, without inquiring whether the exercise
was regular according to the rules of the house,
or irregular and against their rules. I do not
confine the member to his place in the house;
and I am satisfied that there are cases in which
he is entitled to this privilege, when not within
the walls of the representatives' chamber.8 6
However, in applying this interpretation to
the facts before him, Judge Parsons took a sur-
prisingly restrictive view of his own words and
found that Micajah Coffin was not exercising
the functions of his representative office at the
time he called William a convict. Therefore, the
privilege could not protect him against a suit
for defamation.
7
Despite its restrictive holding, and despite
the fact that it was a state case and the clause
being interpreted was broader than most other
state clauses and the federal clause, 8 Coffin has
8 1d. at 78.
See e.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501,
514 (1972); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373-
74 (1951).
86 4 Mass. at 27.
17 Id. at 29-30, 36. For a criticism of the court's
application of its own interpretation, see Celia, supra
note 55, at 28-30.
88 The Massachusetts clause, quoted in full in note
70 supra, protects deliberation, speech and debate,
and forbids prosecutions, actions and complaints in
anyplace whatsoever outside the legislature.
had considerable influence in later judicial in-
terpretations of the meaning of legislative privi-
lege. The Supreme Court in Kilbourn v. Thomp-
son, s9 for example, relied heavily on the lan-
guage, though not the holding, of Coffin.
Kilbourn was the first judicial interpretation
of the federal privilege. A committee of the
United States House of Representatives had
summoned Kilbourn to give testimony. When
Kilbourn refused, the committee voted to ar-
rest and imprison him for contempt. Kilbourn
brought suit for false imprisonment against
both the members of the committee who voted
for the resolution authorizing his arrest and the
sergeant-at-arms who arrested him.
After citing with approval Justice Parson's
dictum in Coffin, 9 the Court took a similar
approach to the interpretation of the federal
privilege:
It would be a narrow view of the constitutional
provision to limit it to words spoken in debate.
The reason of the rule is as forcible in its appli-
cation to written reports presented in that body
by its committees, to resolutions offered, which,
though in writing, must be reproduced in
speech, and to the act of voting, whether it is
done vocally or by passing between the tellers.
In short, to things generally done in a session of
the House by one of its members in relation to
the business before it.9'
On the basis of this interpretation, the Court
went on to find that the members of the com-
mittee were immune from suit. While there
might be "things done, in the one House or the
other, of an extraordinary character, for which
members who take part in the act may be held
legally responsible," 92 on the facts presented,
even though the committee was acting beyond
its authority when it issued the order against
the recalcitrant Mr. Kilbourn,93 the act of vot-
ing for a resolution was one of those "things
generally done in a session of the House ... in
relation to the business before it."19 4 It was,
therefore, protected by the federal legislative
privilege.
89 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
90/d. at 203-04.
91 /d. at 204.
9 1d. The Court has continued to leave open the
possibility of congressional liability for "extraordi-
nary" conduct, although it has never been faced with
such a case. See e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 506 n.26 (1969).93 Id. at 200.
94 Id. at 204.
Because the Kilbourn Court explicitly ex-
panded the protection of the federal clause
beyond pure speech or debate to encompass
protection for legislative acts, the case is fre-
quently cited for the proposition that the clause
must be construed liberally "to effectuate its
purposes." 95 The holding of the Court was not
as liberal as it might have been, however, for
the Court refused to absolve the sergeant-at-
arms from liability for carrying out the commit-
tee order. As the order issued by the committee
was "without authority,"9 6 the arrest of Kil-
bourn was illegal. Since the sergeant-at-arms
was only a legislative functionary, not a legisla-
tor, he was unprotected by the legislative privi-
lege and subject to suit for false imprisonment.
This principle, that employees who implement
the policies of legislators may be subject to suit
even though the legislators themselves are not,
at least arguably interferes with the independ-
ence of the legislature. 97 But it also helps pro-
tect the public against abuses of the legislature,
without violating the literal wording of the con-
stitutional privilege.98 Thus, although Kilbourn,
like Coffin, stressed the importance of the inde-
pendence of the legislature, it effectively com-
promised on the full implications of this princi-
ple.
With the exception of Tenney v. Brandhove,99
Kilbourn was the only major Supreme Court
decision on the subject of legislative privilege
until United States v. Johnson'°° was decided
" United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180
(1966).
96 103 U.S. at 200.
97 The legislature needs the help of non-legislative
employees in carrying out its functions. It may find it
difficult to hire them if they are subject to liability
when in good faith they carry out a legislative order
that turns out later to be without authority.
98 The Court has frequently permitted legislative
functionries to be sued when suit against Congress-
men was prohibited by the clause. See e.g., Doe v.
McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) (suit not allowed
against Congressmen for allegedly slanderous mate-
rial in a committee report, republished and distrib-
uted to the public, but suit against government
printer allowable); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486 (1969) (suit against Congressmen for vote to ex-
clude representative Powell from Congress not al-
lowed; suit allowed against House aides implement-
ing the invalid resolution); Dombrowski v. Eastland,
387 U.S. 82 (1967) (suit prohibited against Chairman
of Senate subcommittee, but allowed against subcom-
mittee counsel).
99 341 U.S. 367 (1951). This case is discussed fully in
the text accompanying notes 167-97 infra.
100 383 U.S. 169 (1966). Along with Kilbourn, John-
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eighty-five years later. Johnson was a United
States Congressman alleged to have taken a
bribe to use his influence to obtain the dismissal
of indictments against certain officials of sav-
ings and loan institutions. He was indicted for
violation of the federal conflict of interest stat-
ute'0 ' and for conspiracy to defraud the United
States. 102 An essential piece of evidence used
against him on the conspiracy count was a
speech favorable to savings and loan associa-
tions which he had delivered in Congress. The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that the use of such evidence was precluded by
the speech or debate clause. 03 It reversed his
conviction, dismissed the conspiracy charge
and remanded the case for a new trial on the
conflict of interest issue. 1 4
Although the Supreme Court had never be-
fore considered whether the speech or debate
clause granted any sort of immunity in situa-
tions in which criminal conduct was intertwined
with legislative acts, 0 5 it had little difficulty in
affirming he court of appeals' decision that
Johnson's conviction on the conspiracy count
could not stand. Its approach to the question
was essentially historical. It noted that the pri-
mary impetus for the development of legislative
privilege was not the fear of private civil suits
such as that in Kilbourn, but fear of "intimida-
tion" of the legislature by the "instigation of
criminal charges against critical or disfavored
legislators by the executive in a judicial
forum."'10 That same fear, according to the
Court, formed the "predominate thrust of the
Speech or Debate Clause" under the "American
son is also cited for the proposition that the speech or
debate clause must be construed liberally. Doe v.
McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 311 (1973).
,01 18 U.S.C. § 281 (1964).
102 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970).
'03 337 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1964), affd 383 U.S. 169
(1966).
04 The court felt that evidence of the speech had
unfairly prejudiced the determination of Johnson's
guilt on the conflict of interest charges. Id. at 204.
105 In Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906),
the Court found that the speech or debate clause
provided no protection to a legislator charged with
criminal conduct outside the sphere of legislative ac-
tivity. (The charge was bribery to influence the Post
Office Department to quash an indictment.) Cf. Wil-
liamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425 (1903) (The
constitutional privilege from arrest, U.S. CoNsr. art.
1 § 6, provides no protection to a legislator charged
with criminal conduct although his imprisonment
would prevent him carrying out his congressional
duties.)
"'6 383 U.S. at 181, 182.
system of separation of powers"'1 7 in which the
clause not only helps assure the independence
of the legislature, but also reinforces the sepa-
ration of the three branches of the govern-
ment. 0" In light of both its historical develop-
ment and the concept of separation of powers,
the Court concluded that the clause prevents
not only prosecutions based on the content of a
legislator's speech, but also those prosecutions
which inquire into the legislator's motivation or
intention for the performance of any legislative
act.
The Government could not, therefore, main-
tain a case against Johnson which in essence
charged him with improper motivation in his
legislative conduct. The Government had in-
quired extensively into the wording of his
speech, his personal knowledge of the facts
included in it and the way in which the speech
was prepared. In short,
the conspiracy theory depended on a showing
that the speech was made solely or primarily to
serve private interests, and thatJohnson in mak-
ing it was not acting in good faith, that is, that he
did not prepare or deliver the speech in the way
an ordinary Congressman prepares or delivers
an ordinary speech. 1' 9
His prosecution on this basis violated both the
letter and the spirit of the speech or debate
clause. The Court was careful to note, however,
that its holding was "limited to prosecutions
involving circumstances such as those pre-
sented in this case ' 1ii in which the Govern-
ment's inquiry into the Congressman's motive
was not an "incidental" part of its case, but
central to the proof of criminal conduct. The
decision did not affect "prosecutions which
though ... founded on a criminal statute of
general application, do not draw in question
the legislative acts of the defendant member of
Congress or his motives for performing
them.""' Thus, although Johnson was entitled
to an evidentiary privilege insofar as the Gov-
ernment attempted to prove his participation in
a conspiracy to defraud the government by ref-
erence to his legislative conduct, the Govern-
ment was not precluded from showing criminal
conduct on the basis of other evidence. Since
the making of the speech was only part of the
1I7d. at 182.
108 Id. at 178.





conspiracy charge, the Court remanded the
case with instructions to allow the Government
the opportunity to prove its case without the
use of evidence "offensive to the Speech or
Debate Clause.'
1 2
The Court in both Kilbourn and Johnson fo-
cused on the need to protect the independence
of the legislature and gave the speech or debate
clause a relatively expansive interpretation. In
later cases, however, the Court has arguably cut
back on the scope of the federal legislative priv-
ilege, focusing less on the need for legislative
independence and more on the separation of
powers concept which is the cornerstone of the
American system of government. In United
States v. Brewster," 3 for example, the Court
stated:
[A]lthough the Speech or Debate Clause's his-
toric roots are in English history, it must be
interpreted in light of the American experience,
and in the context of the American constitu-
tional scheme of government rather than the
-English parliamentary system. We should bear
in mind that the English system differs from
ours in that their Parliament is the supreme
authority, not a coordinate branch. Our speech
or debate privilege was designed to preserve
legislative independence, not supremacy. Our
task, therefore, is to apply the Clause in such a
way as to insure the independence of the legisla-
ture without altering the historic balance of the
three co-equal branches of Government."
4
Brewster involved the prosecution of a Con-
gressman for accepting a bribe "in return for
being influenced in his performance of official
acts in respect to his action, vote, and decision
on postage rate legislation which might at any
time be pending before him in his official ca-
pacity.""' His indictment had been dismissed
by the district court which held that the speech
or debate clause, "particularly in view of the
interpretation given that Clause by the Su-
preme Court in Johnson," protected the Con-
gressman against "any prosecution for alleged
bribery to perform a legislative act."
'" 6
I Id. On remand the Government did not pursue
the conspiracy charge. Johnson was convicted on the
conflict of interest count and his conviction was af-
firmed by the circuit court. 419 F.2d 56 (4th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1970).
113 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
"' Id. at 508. (footnotes omitted).
"
3 Id. at 502.
"
6 Id. at 504.
The Supreme Court disagreed. It first con-
sidered the general question of whether Con-
gressmen could be prosecuted for taking bribes
in exchange for promises relating to legislative
acts. It concluded that neither the speech or
debate clause itself nor prior judicial interpre-
tations of the clause indicated that such a prose-
cution was impermissible. Johnson made clear
that Congressmen may be prosecuted for
crimes "provided that the Government's case
does not rely on legislative acts or the motiva-
tion for legislative acts.''17 Other cases taught
that legislative acts include only "those things
generally said or done in the House or Senate
in the performance of official duties and ...
the motivation for those acts.""' The Court
distinguished sharply between these purely leg-
islative activities and the "political" activities
which Congressmen perform "in part because
they have come to be expected by constituents,
and because they are a means of developing
continuing support for future elections .'' 19 Al-
though entirely "legitimate" and "appropriate,"
such activities, according to the Court, had
never been protected by the speech or debate
clause.
In no case has this Court ever treated the Clause
as protecting all conduct relating to the legis-
lative process. In every case thus far before
this Court, the Speech or Debate Clause has
been limited to an act which was clearly a part of
the legislative process-the due functioning of
the process.1
2 0
While a broader interpretation might be drawn
out of the "flavor of the rhetoric and the sweep
of the language" of prior decisions, neither the
"precise Nwords" nor the "sense of those cases"
mandated such an interpretation. 2 ' The grant
of privilege under the clause was extremely
broad even when the clause was interpreted
narrowly, and the Court refused to expand it.
We would not think it sound or wise, simply out
of an abundance of caution to doubly insure
legislative independence, to extend the privilege
beyond its intended scope, its literal language,




20 Id. at 515-516. "Due functioning" of the legisla-
tive process has become the shorthand phrase for
limiting the scope of legislative privilege to essentially
voting, committee reports, hearings and speeches in
Congress.
121 Id. at 516.
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and its history, to include all things in any way
related to the legislative process.1
22
The fact that Congress itself had the power to
punish its members for misconduct did not per-
suade the Court that the judiciary should leave
that task solely within congressional hands. The
Court felt Congress to be "ill-equipped" to han-
dle the essentially judicial tasks of investigation,
trial and punishment of wrongdoers. 12 Fur-
thermore, if Congress actively attempted to po-
lice and punish its members for conduct not
directly related to the legislative process, the
Court felt that individual legislators would be
"at the mercy of an almost unbridled discretion
of the charging body that functions at once as
accuser, prosecutor, judge and jury from
whose decision there is no established right of
review.' 24 Independence of the legislature
would be more likely to be compromised in
such a situation than by a conventional criminal
trial which provides rigorous procedural safe-
guards.
Finally, the Court was not convinced that the
independence of the legislature was actually
threatened by the potential for executive har-
assment through the initiation of prosecutions
for bribery. Historically, "the check and bal-
ance mechanism, buttressed by unfettered de-
bate in an open society with a free press, has not
encouraged abuses of power or tolerated them
long when they arose."'25 Public reaction to
attempts to intimidate the legislature would
limit the possibility of executive abuse of crimi-
nal statutes designed to assure honest govern-
ment. But, even if some possibility of abuse
existed, the Court felt it had to be balanced
against the potential for harm to the system if
Congressmen could not be prosecuted for brib-
ery.
The purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause is
to protect the individual legislator, not simply
for his own sake, but to preserve the independ-
ence and thereby the integrity of the legislative
process. But financial abuses by way of bribes,
perhaps even more than Executive power,
would gravely undermine legislative integrity
and defeat the right of the public to honest
representation .126
122 Id.
2 Id. at 518.
'24 Id. at 519.
2 Id. at 523.,
126 Id. at 524.
Having thus determined that prosecution for
bribery was not forbidden simply because the
charge "related" to the official conduct of a
legislator, the Court went on to consider the
specifics of the indictment brought against
Brewster. It found that no inquiry into legisla-
tive acts was necessary in order for the Govern-
ment to make out a prima facie case against the
Congressman. The illegal act was the taking of
a bribe, an act which could not possibly be
characterized as legislative in nature. Further-
more, there was no need for the Government to
show that Brewster had actually kept his prom-
ise to vote or to perform any other legislative
act.
To sustain a conviction it is necessary to show
that appellee solicited, received, or agreed to
receive money with knowledge that the donor
was paying him compensation for an official act.
Inquiry into the legislative performance itself is
not necessary; evidence of the Member's knowl-
edge of the alleged briber's illicit reasons for
paying the money is sufficient to carry the case
to the jury
27
The Court dismissed with exceptional brevity
the argument that any inquiry into an alleged
bribe of a legislator for performing a legislative
act was in essence an inquiry into the Congress-
man's motive and thus prohibited underJohn-
son.
That argument misconstrues the concept of mo-
tivation for legislative acts. The Speech or De-
bate Clause does not prohibit inquiry into illegal
conduct simply because it has some nexus to
legislative functions. In Johnson, the Court held
that, on remand, Johnson could be retried on
the conspiracy-to-defraud count, so long as evi-
dence concerning his speech on the House floor
was not admitted. The Court's opinion plainly
implies that had the Government chosen to retry
Johnson on that count, he could not have ob-
tained immunity from prosecution by asserting
that the matter being inquired into was related
to the motivation for his House speech. 28
There were vigorous dissents in Brewster
12
and the case has been extensively criticized by
"2
7 Id. at 527.
1
2 8
1d. at 528. The Court was answering Justice
Brennan, who dissented.
129 Id. at 529 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Id. at 551




commentators.'3 ' But the Court has not re-
treated. Although it continues to maintain that
the clause will be read "broadly to effectuate its
purposes," it has also continued in the cases
subsequent to Brewster carefully to circumscribe
the area of activity protected by the privilege.
Gravel v. United States'3' is particularly on point.
In the Gravel case, Senator Gravel had read
most of the "Pentagon Papers," which were
classified government documents, into the
Congressional Record during a special mid-
night sub-committee meeting. Rodberg, the
Senator's aide, was subpoened to testify before
the grand jury concerning arrangements being
made by the Senator to have the papers re-
published privately. He was also to be ques-
tioned regarding the Senator's source for the
classified documents. Rodberg challenged the
subpoena and Senator Gravel intervened,
claiming that requiring Rodberg to testify on
these matters would violate his speech or debate
privilege. The Court agreed with the Senator
insofar as he claimed the speech or debate
clause to protect himself against civil or criminal
liability for things said or done at the sub-com-
mittee hearing. The Court further agreed with
Gravel that his aide was privileged with regard
to legislative acts which would have been privi-
leged if the Senator had personally performed
them. It noted that it was
literally impossible, in view of the complexities
of the modern legislative process, with Congress
almost constantly in session and matters of legis-
lative concerns constantly proliferating, for
Members of Congress to perform their legisla-
tive tasks without the help of aides and assist-
ants; that the day-to-day work of such aides is so
critical to the Members' performance that they
must be treated as the latter's alter egos; and that
if they are not so recognized, the central role of
the Speech or Debate Clause- to prevent intimi-
dation of legislators by the Executive and ac-
countability before a possibly hostile judiciary-
will inevitably be diminished and frustrated.
3 2
Thus it refused to take a "literalistic"'13  ap-
proach to the language of the speech or debate
clause, which only mentions Senators and Rep-
13 See, e.g., Ervin, The Gravel and Brewster Cases: An
Assault on Congressional Independence, 59 VA. L. REv.
175 (1973); Comment, Brewster, Gravel and Legislative
Immunity, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 125 (1973).
.3- 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
132 Id. at 616-17 (citation omitted).
133 d. at 617.
resentatives, and held the Senator's aide pro-
tected as well. But, in defining the scope of the
Senator's privilege, and the commensurate
privilege of his aide, the Court was considerably
less willing to expand the literal words of the
clause.
Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The
heart of the Clause is speech or debate in either
House. Insofar as the Clause is construed to
reach other matters, they must be an integral
part of the deliberative and communicative
processes by which Members participate in com-
mittee and House proceedings with respect to
the consideration and passage or rejection of
proposed legislation or with respect to other
matters which the Constitution places within the
jurisdiction of either House.I 4
It would not extend the privilege beyond
"pure speech or debate" unless it was necessary
to "prevent indirect impairment of such delib-
erations.."135 The Court did not think that pri-
vate publication was essential to the business of
the Senate. It was not a legislative act, and
questioning on the matter would not violate the
Senate's independence nor expose it to the
threat of intimidation by the executive branch.
Similarly, the Court felt the grand jury could
question the aide on the Senator's source for
the classified documents "as long as no legisla-
tive act was implicated by the questions.'
'1 6
"Rodberg's immunity, testimonial or otherwise,
extends only to legislative acts as to which the
Senator himself would be immune.' 1 37 It there-
fore remanded the case with instructions to
fashion a protective order forbidding the ques-
tioning of Rodberg only to that extent.13
1
34 Id. at 625.
135 Id.
1
36 Id. at 628.
137 Id.
'38 Another recent case which continues the limit-
ing approach to the definition of legislative act is Doe
v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973). In Doe, suit was
brought against members of Congress and the Public
Printer and Superintendent of Documents for the
publication of a libel in a congressional committee
report which was distributed publicly. Members of
the committee were immune from suit for the mate-
rial included in their original report, since the mak-
ing of the report was a legislative act. However, gen-
eral publication and distribution of their report was
not protected. Although the Court agreed that public
dissemination of the information in congressional re-
ports served an important function, it did not think
such dissemination was an "integral part of the delib-
erative and communicative processes by which Mem-
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The clear import of these federal speech or
debate clause cases, taken together, is that the
legislative privilege embodied in the clause is
not without limit. While mindful of the English
and colonial common law origin of the clause,
the Court has always been careful to interpret it
in light of its American constitutional context.
Thus, although it has recognized that the privi-
lege is one method by which the framers of the
Constitution attempted to ensure effective sep-
aration of powers, it has also recognized that
the clause cannot be read so as to allow one of
the three co-equal branches to achieve suprem-
acy over the other two. In making the necessary
compromises between these competing consid-
erations, the Court has at times perhaps drawn
arbitrary or even inconsistent lines between
protected and unprotected activity. 139 But im-
plicit in all its decisions is the recognition of the
fact that in spite of the complexities of the
modern legislative process and in spite of the
need for legislative independence, legislative
privilege is necessarily limited by the general
constitutional scheme of government.
Comparison of the Constitutional Privilege with
the Doctrine of Official Immunity
Legislators are not the only officials who en-
joy a privilege from suit for those things "said
or done ... in the exercise of the functions of
[their] office."140 Other governmental officials
have a similar, though narrower, privilege un-
der the common law doctrine of official immu-
nity. The principal focus of the doctrine of
official immunity is the need to protect the
independence of government officials. The Su-
hers participate in committee and House proceed-
ings." Id. at 314.
[W]e cannot accept the proposition that in order
to perform its legislative function Congress not
only must at times consider and use actionable
material but also must be free to disseminate it to
the public at large, no matter how injurious to
private reputation that material might be.
Id. at 316. The Congressmen were immune from suit
for the order of publication under the rationale of
Kilbourn, but the printer who had carried out the
unprotected order was held answerable for the libel.
139 Numerous commentators have criticized the
Court on this basis. See, e.g., Ervin, The Gravel and
Brewster Cases: An Assault on Congressional Independ-
ence, 59 VA. L. REV. 175 (1973); Reinstein & Silver-
glate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1973); Comment, Brewster,
Gravel and Legislative Immunity, 73 CoLuM. L. REV. 125
(1973).
140 Coffin, 4 Mass. at 27.
preme Court articulated the importance of the
principle with regard to judges in Bradley v.
Fisher in 1871:14a
[lit is a general principle of the highest impor-
tance to the proper administration ofjustice that
a judicial officer, in exercising the authority
vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own
convictions, without apprehension of personal
consequences to himself. Liability to answer to
everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by
the action of the judge, would be inconsistent
with the possession of this freedom, and would
destroy that independence without which noju-
diciary can be either respectable or useful. 4'
Twenty-four years later, the Court made clear
that the same reasoning applies to high ranking
executive officials:
We are of the opinion that the same general
considerations of public policy and convenience
which demand for judges of courts of superior
jurisdiction immunity from civil suits for dam-
ages arising from acts done by them in the
course of the performance of theirjudicial func-
tion, apply to a large extent to official communi-
cations made by heads of Executive Depart-
ments when engaged in the discharge of duties
imposed upon them by law. The interests of the
people require that due protection be accorded
to them in respect of their official acts.'
4 3
More recently, in Barr v. Matteo, 44 the Court
reiterated:
[O]fficials of government should be free to exer-
cise their duties unembarrassed by the fear of
damage suits in respect of acts done in the
course of those duties-suits which would con-
sume time and energies which would otherwise
be devoted to governmental service and the
threat of which might appreciably inhibit the
fearless, vigorous, and effective administration
of policies of government.'
45
The Court then expressly extended the concept
of official immunity to protect lesser officials,
noting that
[t~he privilege is not a badge or emolument of
exalted office, but an expression of a policy
4' 80 U.S. 335 (1871). The common law origin of
this privilege for judges extends back to the time of
Edward III. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239 n.4
(1974).
"12 80 U.S. at 347.
143 Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896).




designed to aid in the effective functioning of
government. The complexities and magnitude
of governmental activity have become so great
that there must of necessity be a delegation and
redelegation of authority as to many functions,
and we cannot say that these functions become
less important simply because they are exercised
by officers of lower rank in the executive hierar-
chy.
14 6
Although strikingly similar to the speech or
debate privilege in this emphasis on the need
for government officials to be independent, of-
ficial immunity is narrower than speech or de-
bate protection in two important ways: some
officials enjoy only a qualified immunity, and
regardless of whether the immunity is absolute
or qualified, it protects the official only against
civil actions. The immunity is granted in order
to ensure that these officials can and will carry
out their duties. It is limited in recognition of
the fact that an absolute immunity for all offi-
cials in all situations is both unnecessary to
achieve the purposes of immunity and intolera-
ble in light of the great harm that can be done
to individuals by officials who abuse their
power. As a check against this abuse the privi-
lege of some officials is "conditioned on the
good faith of the actor and the purpose of his
conduct."' 47 In general, only those officials with
146 Id. at 572-73. States have long recognized offi-
cial immunity for the actions of state and municipal
governmental officials. See, e.g., Mills v. Denny, 245
Iowa 584, 63 N.W.2d 222 (1954) (qualified immunity
for mayor and city council members); Tanner v.
Gault, 20 Ohio App. 243, 153 N.E. 124 (1925) (abso-
lute privilege for county commissioners alleged to
have slandered plaintiff); Bolton v. Walker, 197
Mich. 699, 164 N.W. 420 (1917) (absolute immunity to
commission member testifying before tax commis-
sion); Ivie v. Minton, 75 Ore. 483, 147 P. 395 (1915)
(qualified privilege for councilman testifying before
council committee of which he was not a member);
Weber v. Lane, 99 Mo. App. 69, 71 S.W. 1099 (1903)
(qualified privilege of alderman to investigate com-
plaint against citizen). State officials have also been
held to retain their immunity when sued in federal
court. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975) (qualified immunity for school board members
sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232 (1974) (qualified immunity for governor and
national guardsmen under § 1983); Nelson v. Knox,
256 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1958) (qualified privilege of city
council in passing ordinances); Cobb v. City of Mal-
den, 202 F.2d 701 (Ist Cir. 1953) (qualified privilege of
city council members for "acts done by them ... in
performance of their official duty as they understood
it." Id. at 707 (Magruder, C. J., concurring).
147 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW oF TORTS, 294 n.2
(1956).
considerable breadth of authority and discre-
tion are protected by absolute immunity.
Judges and high ranking executive officials, for
example, as long as they act within the arguable
bounds of their jurisdiction and authority, can-
not be questioned with regard to their motiva-
tion for a particular act. 4 s Members of school
boards 149 policemen,5 0 and even governors,1 5 1
on the other hand, must be acting in good
faithM2 in order for their actions to be privi-
leged.
146 With respect to judges this principle was estab-
lished in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871):
Nor can this exemption of the judges from civil
liability be affected by the motives with which
their judicial acts are performed. The purity of
their motives cannot in this way be the subject of
judicial inquiry.
Id. at 372.
In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896), the
Court spelled out the purpose of the absolute immu-
nity in detail:
[I]t is clear . . . that [a high ranking executive
officer] cannot be held liable to a civil suit for
damages on account of official communications
made by him pursuant to an act of Congress, and
in respect of matters within his authority, by
reason of any personal motive that might be
alleged to have prompted his action; for personal
motives cannot be imputed to duly authorized
official conduct. In exercising the functions of
his office, the head of an Executive Department,
keeping within the limits of his authority, should
not be under an apprehension that the motives
that control his official conduct may, at any time,
become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for
damages. It would seriously cripple the proper
and effective administration of public affairs as
entrusted to the executive branch of the govern-
ment, if he were subjected to any such restraint.
'49 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
150 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
'5' Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
152 The good faith requirement contains both sub-
jective and objective elements. In Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975) the Court explained with
respect to school board members that
[tihe official ... must be acting sincerely and
with a belief that he is doing right, but an act
violating a student's constitutional rights can be
no more justified by ignorance or disregard of
settled, indisputable law .... than by the pres-
ence of actual malice .... [A] school board
member ... must be held to a standard of con-
duct based not only on permissible intentions,
but also on knowledge of the basic, unquestioned
constitutional rights of his charges.
Good faith is not always a prerequisite to privilege for
lesser officials when the charge is defamation and the
official has been addressing himself to matters within
his authority. Compare Shellburne Inc. v. New Castle
County, 293 F. Supp. 237, 244 (D. Del. 1968) ("Mem-
bers of lower legislative bodies [zoning board] . ..
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With respect to criminal liability, official im-
munity provides no testimonial privilege, and
officials may be held criminally liable for their
conduct. Most courts have felt that the lack of
an exemption from criminal liability will not
interfere with the policy behind the doctrine of
official immunity. As one court explained in
answer to a United States Attorney's claim of
immunity to a mail fraud charge:
(C]ivil suits are easily adaptable for harassment
purposes since any individual can institute a civil
suit against another .... Without immunity, ju-
dicial officials who dissatisfy certain people
might easily be plagued by a rash of civil suits
predicated on their official conduct. ... In con-
trast, this criminal prosecution was initiated by
government officials in solemn performance of
their duties and only after the defendants were
indicted by a grand jury. Clearly, the potential
for harassment . . . is not present in criminal
prosecutions.I53
Even judges, who enjoy exceptionally broad
immunity, are not exempt from criminal liabil-
ity. While it is still possible to find quotations to
the effect that judges cannot be made crimi-
nally liable for their judicial acts,' 154 it may be
doubted that such a rule was ever uniformly
followed. For instance, in Braatelien v. United
States,'55 ajudge was convicted of "conspiracy to
defraud the United States by corruptly admin-
istering or procuring the corrupt administra-
tion of an Act of Congress."'5 6 Although the
court noted that the crime charged was "distinct
from his official acts"'57 and might have been
"consummated without the performance of a
single judicial act on his part' 58 the central core
usually have a qualified immunity for defamation.")
with Tanner v. Gault, 20 Ohio App. 243, 245-46, 153
N.E. 124, 125 (1925) ("[T]here is a well-established
general rule ... that libelous or slanderous matter
published in due course of legislative proceedings is
absolutely privileged, and will not support an action,
although made maliciously and with knowledge of
falsity, if pertinent or relevant to matters under in-
quiry, and that this broad and comprehensive rule
includes within its scope the proceedings of all legisla-
tive bodies, state or municipal.")
'0 United States v. Anzelmo, 319 F. Supp. 1106,
1118-19 (E.D. La. 1970) (citation omitted).
14 See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239
n.4 (1974) (quoting 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 235 (1927); 30 AN!. JUR., JUDGES § 50
(1969).
153 147 F.2d 888, (8th Cir. 1945).
'




of the Government's case against the judge was
the manner in which he conducted his judicial
duties. Similarly, in United States v. Manton, 159 a
criminal conspiracy conviction was upheld
against ajudge for his participation in a scheme
under which he was paid to exercise his judicial
power in favor of certain parties, without re-
gard to the merits of their case. Evidence of his
participation through his meetings with coun-
sel, his scheduling of cases, the manner in
which he presided at trial, and the fact that he
rendered decisions in favor of defendants was
all held admissible with no discussion of immu-
nity.
More recently, in O'Shea v. Littleton, 0 the Su-
preme Court in strong dictum indicated that
judges may be criminally liable for the exercise
of their judicial duties in such a way as to wil-.
fully deprive individuals of their constitutional
rights. In O'Shea, suit was brought for injunc-
tive relief against a state judge and magistrate
alleged to be depriving plaintiffs, citizens of
racially tense Cairo, Illinois, of their constitu-
tional rights through discriminatory setting of
bond, sentences, and jury fees in the criminal
cases that came before them. Although refus-
ing to grant the injunction,' 61 the Court made
special note of the fact that state officials, in-
cluding judges, were subject to criminal penal-
ties under federal law for willful discrimination
that deprives a citizen of his constitutional
rights.'62 In contrasting a judge's immunity
from civil suit with his liability in criminal pros-
ecutions, the Court observed: "the judicially
fashioned doctrine of official immunity does
not reach 'so far as to immunize criminal con-
duct proscribed by an Act of Congress'. ' ' j ' Al-
though dictum, the words cannot be dismissed
as insignificant. The Court was taking special
note of the fact, and issuing a clear warning to
all state officials, that the doctrine of official
immunity does not afford protection against
criminal prosecutions.
The doctrine of official immunity is not, of
159 107 F.2d 834 (2nd Cir. 1938).
160 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
161 The Court refused to grant relief on grounds
that plaintiffs had failed to present an actual case or
controversy since none of them was actually
threatened by the alleged discriminatory conduct of
the state officials.
162 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970) makes it a criminal of-
fense to conspire to deprive a citizen of his constitu-
tional rights.
16 414 U.S. at 503 (quotingGravel, 408 U.S. at 627).
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course, limited only to judicial and executive
officials. It has frequently been applied to offi-
cials who act in a legislative capacity, such as
municipal aldermen, county and regional com-
missioners, and members of other legislative or
quasi-legislative boards.164 But, because most
state legislators have the protection of state con-
stitutional speech or debate privilege, the con-
cept of official immunity is rarely needed to
guard their independence. In fact, one might
assume that since immunity for legislators has
so long been a part of the constitutional frame-
work of American government, the doctrine of
official immunity has been totally supplanted
by the broader concept of speech or debate
protection. Arguably, however, the doctrine of
official immunity for legislators is still a viable
alternative for determining the scope of a legis-
lator's privilege in those situations in which a
constitutional privilege is unavailable.
Recognition of a Federal Legislative Privilege
Outside the Federal Constitutional Context
As noted earlier,' 65 a federal common law
legislative privilege could be formulated along
lines exactly parallel to the speech or debate
privilege of the federal constitution, or it could
be patterned after the more limited privilege of
official immunity. 66 The argument that the lat-
ter approach is more appropriate is predicated
in part on a number of Supreme Court cases
dealing with state legislators and legislatures.
Not only do these cases themselves suggest that
state legislators retain only official immunity
when no specific constitutional provision pro-
tects them, but a comparison of the Court's
approach and language in these cases with that
in the speech or debate clause cases also leads to
the same conclusion.
There is only one Supreme Court case, Ten-
ney v. Brandhove, 167 which deals directly with the
subject of legislative privilege outside the con-
text of a suit against federal congressmen. The
case is confusing because the source of the leg-
islative privilege which the Court found appli-
cable is never specifically identified. Tenney
was chairman of a California state legislative
164 See citations in notes 146 & 152 supra.
" See text following note 52 supra.
166 It is conceivable that a court could decide to
recognize no privilege whatsoever. The likelihood of
this appears so remote that it is not considered in this
comment.
167 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
committee. Brandhove, by means of a petition,
attempted to convince the California legislature
not to appropriate funds for the committee,
charging that it had not only used him as a
"tool" to smear a particular candidate for of-
fice, but had also conspired with the opposition
candidate's campaign committee for the same
purpose. The committee summoned 'Brand-
hove to testify and explain both his charges
and certain conflicts with his previous testi-
mony. Although Brandhove appeared before
the committee, he refused to testify. He was
prosecuted for contempt, but the prosecution
was later dropped. 68 He then brought suit
against the committee under §1983 of the Civil
Rights Act, 69 alleging that the hearing to which
he had been called to testify had not been held
for any legislative purpose, but to "intimidate
... silence . . . deter and prevent him from
effectively exercising his constitutional rights of
free speech and to petition the Legislature for
redress of grievances . 1.7. "' The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
complaint stated a cause of action, but the Su-
preme Court reversed. It treated the issue
raised by the case as essentially one of statutory
construction: "Did Congress by the general lan-
guage of its 1871 statute mean to overturn the
tradition of legislative freedom achieved in
England by Civil War and carefully preserved
in the formation of State and National govern-
ments here?"''
The Court answered its own question in the
negative. It reviewed in detail the development
of the concept of legislative privilege in Eng-
land and the United States, focusing principally
on the importance of the privilege in protecting
the independence of the legislature, and the
widespread adoption of the privilege at the
state level. Noting that legislative privilege was
a "tradition . . . well grounded in history and
reason," the Court was convinced that Con-
gress, itself a staunch advocate of legislative
freedom, did not mean to limit the right of
legislators to act in their traditional legislative
sphere by subjecting them to civil suits under
the general language of §1983.172
168 The jury failed to return a verdict and the com-
mittee did not pursue the prosecution. Id. at 371.
169 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
'0 341 U.S. at 371.
'7' Id. at 376.
"'2 Id. The Court has subsequently held that § 1983
does not abrogate the traditional immunity of other
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The Court then considered whether the Ten-
ney committee had been acting within a sphere
of traditional legislative activity. It first noted
that the fact that Chairman Tenney might have
had an "unworthy purpose" in calling Brand-
hove before the committee would not destroy
his legislative privilege. 7 3 The privilege would
have no value if a legislator were subject to
liability based on speculations as to his motives
for a particular act. Motive was irrelevant as
long as the legislator was acting within the tra-
ditional legislative sphere. Furthermore, in re-
viewing the actions of the Tenney committee,
the Court noted that legislative investigations
are "an established part of representative gov-
ernment,"'74 and on the facts before it there
appeared to be substantial reason for the com-
mittee to have recalled Mr. Brandhove, regard-
less of the personal motives of the Chairman.
Legislative committees have been charged with
losing sight of their duty of disinterestedness. In
times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive
motives are readily attributed to legislative con-
duct and are as readily believed. Courts are not
the place for such controversies. Self-discipline
and the voters must be the ultimate reliance for
discouraging or correcting such abuses. The
courts should not go beyond the narrow confines
of determining that a committee's inquiry may be
fairly deemed within its province. To find that a
committee's investigation has exceeded the
bounds of legislative power it must be obvious
that there was a usurpation of functions exclu-
sively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive.
The present case does not present such a situa-
tion. Brandhove indicated that evidence previ-
ously given by him to the committee was false,
and he raised serious charges concerning the
work of a committee investigating a problem
within legislative concern. The Committee was
entitled to assert a right to call the plaintiff be-
fore it and examine him.
175
Thus, the Court concluded, since the Califor-
nia legislators were "acting in a field where
governmental officials. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308 (1975) (qualified immunity for school
board members not abrogated); Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232 (1973) (qualified immunity for governor
and officials of national guard not abrogated); Pier-
son v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (absolute immu-
nity of judges and qualified immunity of police offi-
cers not abrogated).
173 341 U.S. at 377.
174Id.
1
75 Id. at 377-78 (footnotes omitted).
legislators traditionally have power to act,' ' 76
they were immune from suit under §1983.
At the time of the suit, the California consti-
tution had no speech or debate privilege, and
nowhere in the opinion does the Court suggest
that the federal constitutional privilege was
being applied to the state legislators. There-
fore, it seems clear that the Court was adopting
some sort of federal common law immunity to
protect Tenney and his committee. What is far
less clear, however, is whether the immunity
applied was commensurate with the federal
speech or debate privilege. Some support for
the view that the Tenney privilege is equivalent
to speech or debate protection is at least implied
by the fact that the Court cites Tenney in most of
the recent speech or debate clause cases in
which the scope of the federal privilege is dis-
cussed.17 7 The position is further strengthened
by the Court's own words in United States v.
Johnson that the Tenney Court "viewed the state
legislative privilege [applied to Tenney] as
being on a parity with the similar federal privi-
lege.... '178 However, despite the Court's ref-
erences to Tenney in the federal speech or de-
bate clause cases, a careful examination of the
language of Tenney and of the Court's citations
to the case both within and without the context
of the speech or debate privilege strongly sug-
gests that the protection granted Tenney was
derived not from the constitutional protection
afforded federal legislators but from the com-
mon law doctrine of official immunity.
First, it should be noted that the language of
the Tenney Court does not determine the scope
of the privilege applied. The catch phrase of
the Tenney opinion was that the state legislators
were immune from civil liability under §1983
for "acts done within their sphere of legislative
activity."'79 These words are, of course, strik-
1
7 6 Id. at 379.
177 See, e.g., Gravel, 408 U.S. at 624; Brewster, 408
U.S. at 514;Johnson, 383 U.S. at 179.
178 383 U.S. at 180. See also, Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486 (1969) in which the Court stated "This
Court has on four occasions, Dombrowski v. East-
land, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); United States v. Johnson,
383 U.S. 169 (1966); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367 (1951); and Kilbourn v. Thompson, 130 U.S. 168
(1881) been called upon to determine if allegedly
unconstitutional action taken by legislators or legisla-
tive employees is insulated from judicial review by the
Speech or Debate Clause." 395 U.S. at 501. But see
Brewster, 408 U.S. at 516, n.10 in which the Court said
Tenney was not a speech or debate clause case.
179 341 U.S. at 376.
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ingly similar to those used by the Court in
Kilbourn to hold that under the speech or de-
bate clause federal Congressmen are immune
from liability for "things generally done in a
session of the House ... in relation to the
business before it."' 80 They are also close to the
words of the Court injohnson and Gravel, both
of which held that federal legislators could not
be prosecuted for their "legislative acts."18'
However, the language of Tenney is also quite
similar to that used by the Court to describe the
scope of the doctrine of official immunity. For
example, in Bradley, the Court found judges to
be immune from liability "for acts done by them
in the exercise of their judicial functions."" 2
And, in Spalding, the Court held executive offi-
cials immune while "exercising the functions of
[their] office ... within the limits of [their]
authority.' 8 s Thus, one must go beyond the
language of the Court to determine the nature
of the privilege it recognized.
The Government, in its brief before the three
judge panel of the Seventh Circuit in the Craig
case, suggested that Tenney must be viewed as
an official immunity case because the Supreme
Court has "aligned" Tenney with other official
immunity cases.18 4 For example, in Pierson v.
Ray, 85 in which the Court held that §1983 did
not abolish the common law official immunity
of judges, the Court referred to Tenney in its
discussion of common law immunities as if Ten-
ney were a traditional common law immunity
case.
186
Similarly, in both Wood v. Strickland18 7 and
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 188 two cases involving the civil
liability of state officials under § 1983, the Court
referred to Tenney in the course of its analysis of
the official immunity limitations on §1983, with-
out distinguishing the grant of immunity in
Tenney as broader than that applied in suits
against nonlegislative officials. 8 ' Finally, in Doe
180 103 U.S. at 204.
181 408 U.S. at 619; 383 U.S. at 185.
182 80 U.S. at 347.
8 161 U.S. at 498.
184 Brief for the United States at 18-21.
185 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
186 The Court stated: "The legislative record gives
no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish
wholesale all common-law immunities. Accordingly,
this Court held in Tenney v. Brandhove that the immu-
nity of legislators for acts within the legislative role
was not abolished." Id. at 554 (citation omitted).
187 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
188 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
189 420 U.S. at 316-21; 416 U.S. at 243-44.
v. McMillan,'9 a case in which the Court had to
deal specifically with the parameters of both the
speech or debate privilege and official immu-
nity, the court used Tenney only in its discussion
of official immunity. 191
One might argue, however, that even if the
Court has "aligned" Tenney with its official im-
munity cases, such an alignment is not neces-
sarily dispositive of the issue of a legislator's
criminal liability. Official immunity is, after all,
a flexible doctrine which varies in scope with
the type of official involved. When applied to
legislators it might, therefore, be broad enough
to give them immunity from civil and criminal
liability rather than just the traditional civil im-
munity granted to judicial and executive offi-
cials. Outside the constitutional context, where
balance of power considerations must be given
considerable weight, there is no apparent rea-
son for granting such significantly broader im-
munity to legislators, however. The purpose of
official immunity is to safeguard the independ-
ence of the official. That purpose is adequately
served by limiting the possibility of civil suits.
Criminal prosecutions, regardless of the official
accused, simply do not provide the same "po-
tential for harassment"' 19 2 as civil suits.
In O'Shea v. Littleton, 193 the Supreme Court
gave some indication that it not only recognizes
an official immunity for state legislators which
is different from speech or debate protection,
but also that, at least for purposes of a federal
criminal prosecution, it views all forms of offi-
cial immunity as equal. O'Shea, it will be re-
membered, was a suit for injunctive relief
against a state judge and magistrate in which
the Court, albeit in dictum, went out of its way
to warn that state officials may be criminally
liable for exercise of their official duties in such
90 412 U.S. 306 (1973). This case is also discussed in
note 138 supra.
191 In Doe, both a Congressman and the govern-
ment printer were sued for publication of a libel in a
committee report. The Court discussed the Con-
gressman's immunity under the speech or debate
clause. It dealt with the printer's immunity under the
doctrine of official immunity. Tenney was cited only in
the section of the case dealing with the printer's im-
munity. It was cited for three specific propositions: 1)
"official immunity has been held applicable to offi-
cials of the Legislative Branch," 412 U.S. at 319 n.13;
2) the scope of the official immunity conferred is not
the same for all officials, id. at 319; 3) the scope of
immunity is tied to the range of official authority, id.
at 320.
192 United States v. Anzelmo, 319 F. Supp. at 1119.
193 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
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a way as to violate federal law. Far from except-
ing legislators from this warning, the Court
made specific reference to their potential liabil-
ity:
[W]hatever may be the case with respect to civil
liability generally, or civil liability for willful cor-
ruption, we have never held that the perform-
ance of the duties of judicial, legislative, or exec-
utive officers, requires or contemplates the im-
munization of otherwise criminal deprivations
of constitutional rights.1
94
This statement that legislators are so liable
stands in direct contrast to the holding of the
Court in Johnson that under the federal speech
or debate clause the legislative conduct of fed-
eral legislators cannot constitute either the basis
for a criminal prosecution or evidence that a
crime was committed. The implication seems
clear-state legislators do not enjoy the same
broad protection given federal legislators un-
der the speech or debate clause.
If, as the above mentioned cases seem to
indicate, Tenney merely recognized the tradi-
tional common law official immunity of legisla-
tors, why does the Court cite it in the speech or
debate clause cases as if the privilege it ex-
tended were commensurate with the speech or
debate privilege? There is no clear answer to
this question. In some cases it appears that the
Court simply cites Tenney inaccurately. For in-
stance, in Gravel, the Court stated:
Thus, voting by Members and committee re-
ports are protected; and we recognize today- as
the Court has recognized before, Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. at 204; Tenney v. Brand-
hove, 341 U.S. 367, 377-378 (1951)- that a
Member's conduct at legislative committee hear-
ings, although subject to judicial review in var-
ious circumstances, as is legislation itself, may
not be made the basis for a civil or criminal
judgment against a Member because that con-
duct is within the 'sphere of legitimate legislative
activity.' 95
Clearly neither Kilbourn nor Tenney said any-
thing about criminal liability. Tenney was care-
fully limited to civil liability under §1983 and
Kilbourn did not raise the issue of criminal pros-
ecutions. The immunity of federal legislators
under the federal clause from possible criminal
liability for their legislative acts was not settled
untilJohnson was decided in 1966, and theJohn-
" Id. at 503 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
195 408 U.S. at 624.
son court expressly noted that neither Kilbourn
nor Tenney nor any other case "cast bright light
on the question." 196
In most of the speech or debate clause cases,
however, the Court's use of Tenney can proba-
bly be best understood as a reference to a case
in which the Court has treated analogous, but
not identical, issues. Official immunity and
speech or debate privilege overlap a great deal.
If the Court has not adequately distinguished
between the two in the speech or debate clause
cases it is probably because on the particular
facts of the case such a distinction was simply
not crucial. Since official immunity in its broad-
est form is narrower than speech or debate
immunity, the protection recognized under the
former would clearly be recognized under the
latter. Thus, in the context of the speech or
debate cases, there is normally no need meticu-
lously to distinguish Tenney as recognizing only
the narrower immunity. The language of Ten-
ney is directly and easily transferable to discus-
sions of speech or debate protection.1
97
Bond v. Floyd, 98 a case which does not even
mention Tenney, also helps support the argu-
ment that the Court does not view the privilege
granted the legislators in Tenney as the equiva-
lent of speech or debate protection. Julian
Bond was elected to the Georgia legislature for
a special one year term to commence in January
1966.1 99 Because of certain statements he had
made about the conduct of the Vietnam War,
20 0
the Georgia House, after a hearing at which
Bond testified, concluded that he could not
honestly take either the oath of office required
by the Georgia constitution or the oath to sup-
port the Constitution of the United States. The
clerk refused to administer either oath and the
House refused to seat him. Bond sued for in-
196 383 U.S. at 180.
197 Similarly, since on the facts the Tenney commit-
tee's conduct was protected under the narrowest view
of official immunity (the committee was clearly en-
gaged in legislative business and there was ample
evidence of a legislative purpose in recalling Bran-
dhove to explain his prior testimony), there was no
need to distinguish between any broader speech or
debate privilege and the doctrine of official immu-
nity.
198 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
199 He was subsequently re-elected in a special elec-
tion held to fill the vacancy caused by the House's
refusal to seat him. He was re-elected in the regular
November, 1966 election as well. Id. at 128.
200 The statements are reproduced in the Court's
opinion. Id. at 121-22.
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junctive relief under §1983201 against the
speaker and speaker pro-tem, certain officers
of the House, and several members as repre-
sentatives of the membership of the entire
body.
The state argued that the Georgia constitu-
tion specified the qualifications for the office of
state legislator, that the oath provisions consti-
tuted part of those qualifications, and that the
House had the power to "look beyond the plain
meaning of the oath provisions . . . to [deter-
mine] whether a given Representative may take
the oath with sincerity. '20 2 Although admitting
that it could not exclude a duly elected repre-
sentative on racial or other clearly unconstitu-
tional grounds, the state argued that the oath
requirement was not unconstitutional and,
therefore, "there should be no judicial review
of the legislature's power to judge whether a
prospective member may conscientiously take
the oath required by the State and Federal Con-
stitutions.120 3 Bond, on the other hand, main-
tained that the judgment of the House that he
could not honestly take the oaths of office vio-
lated his first amendment rights.
The Supreme Court agreed that the legisla-
ture had infringed Bond's right to free speech:
[W]e do not quarrel with the State's contention
that the oath provisions of the United States and
Georgia Constitutions do not violate the First
Amendment. But this requirement does not au-
thorize a majority of state legislators to test the
sincerity with which another duly elected legisla-
tor can swear to uphold the Constitution. 2
Bond's statements did not violate any law. Al-
though the state could require an oath of loy-
alty, that oath could not be used to "[limit] its
legislators' capacity to discuss their views of lo-
cal or national policy.
'205
Nowhere in the opinion did the Court men-
tion the holding of Tenney that under §1983
Congress did not extinguish the immunity of
legislators acting in their traditional sphere of
legislative activity. Nor did it distinguish the
two cases on the basis that Brandhove had sued
for damages and Bond was asking for injunc-
tive relief. It did not mention Tenney at all. Nor
201 Also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3), 1343(4), 2201,
and 42 U.S.C. § 1971(d), 1988 (1970).




205 Id. at 135.
did it discuss whether state legislative function-
aries, such as the clerk of the Georgia House,
might be sued although members of the House
themselves could not. In short, the Court did
not suggest that a state legislator sued under
federal laws had any sort of speech or debate
protection.
This disposition of Bond is simply inexplica-
ble if the Court conceives of Tenney as affording
state legislators a privilege commensurate with
speech or debate protection. At the federal
level such a suit clearly cannot be maintained.
In Powell v. McCormack,2 °0 the Court explicitly so
held. Congressman Powell, although duly
elected and meeting all the qualifications for
the office of Representative, was not permitted
to take the oath of office pending a House
committee investigation into certain of his activ-
ities. After its investigation the committee rec-
ommended that Powell be seated as a Member,
but censured. The full House, however, voted
to exclude him from membership. Powell then
brought suit for injunctive and declaratory re-
lief against the Speaker, Clerk, Sergeant-at-
Arms, Doorkeeper, and certain named Mem-
bers of the entire House. 20 7 The Court immedi-
ately dismissed the action against the Congress-
men as violative of their speech or debate privi-
lege. The action was allowed to proceed, how-
ever, against the House employees.
20 °
Of course, Powell was decided afterBond, but
for purposes of this discussion, the timing of
the two cases is largely irrelevant. The distinc-
tion between a suit against employees of the
House and Members of the House themselves
which the Powell Court recognized and which
the Bond Court did not even mention, was es-
tablished as early as 1881 in Kilbourn, and that
same distinction was reaffirmed in Tenney.
20 9 If
Tenney held that state legislators are protected
by an immunity based on the speech or debate
clause, the Bond Court certainly would have
been bound to deal with the distinction. Thus,
206 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
2107 Although the Congress which had excluded him
had ended and a new Congress was in session, the
Court held that Powell's claim for back salary pre-
vented the case from being moot. Id. at 500.
208 Id. at 504-06. As in Kilbourn, the Court left for
future decision the question of whether suit could be
maintained against the Congressmen if no other rem-
edy was available and no House employee had partic-
ipated in the action with the Congressmen. Id. at 506
n.26.
209 341 U.S. at 378.
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by totally ignoring the question of the immunity
of the Georgia legislators, the Court implicitly
indicated that whatever legislative privilege
state legislators enjoy in federal court, it is con-
siderably more limited than speech or debate
protection.
Another indication thatBond may be cited for
such a proposition is the failure of the Powell
Court to distinguish or even mention Bond in
connection with the question of legislative privi-
lege. Since it cited Bond in regard to other
matters, 210 the Court was clearly aware of the
disposition of the case. Yet obviously it felt no
need to explain why a suit against the members
of the Georgia legislature was allowable and suit
against the Members of the federal Congress
was not. The most probable reason for this lack
of even an explanatory footnote is simply that
the Court saw no conflict between the two cases
because the privilege of state legislators is not
commensurate with speech or debate privi-
lege.
21 1
Jordan v. Hutchenson,2 12 a Fourth Circuit case
decided prior to Bond, explicitly holds that the
immunity of state legislators is more limited
than the speech or debate protection given fed-
eral legislators. In Jordan, plaintiffs alleged that
a committee of the Virginia legislature was act-
ing as part of a conspiracy of all elected officials
in the state to "intimidate, discourage and
impede the plaintiffs and all Negro citizens of
Virginia from using the courts as a means of
ending the practices of racial segregation in
that state. 21 3 They sought an order requiring
210 Bond was cited in reference to the claim of moot-
ness. 395 U.S. at 499.
211 Another case which illustrates the difference in
the Court's treatment of federal legislators is Eastland
v. United States' Servicemen's Funds, 421 U.S. 491
(1975). In Eastland the Court refused to quash a sub-
poena issued by a congressional committee investigat-
ing a servicemen's club, although the members ar-
gued that compliance with the subpoena would vio-
late their first amendment rights. The Court found
the actions of the committee and its members im-
mune from judicial interference because of the
speech or debate clause. Analysis of the speech or
debate privilege was central to the Court's decision.
Compare not only Bond, but also Denny v. Bush, 367
U.S. 908 (1961) affg per curiam Bush, Orleans Parish
School Board, 191 F.Supp. 871 (E.D.La. 1961). In
Denny the Court affirmed with no discussion of legis-
lative privilege, the lower court injunction against a
state legislature attempting to evade court ordered
desegregation.
212 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963).
21
1
3Id. at 599. The Virginia legislature had at-
the prosecution of two of the named defend-
ants under 18 U.S.C. §§241 and 242,214 and an
injunction prohibiting the investigatory activity
of the committee. Holding that the plaintiffs
had stated a cause of action, the court noted:
Although the federal courts will recognize and
respect the state's right to exercise through its
legislature broad investigatory powers, never-
theless these powers are not unlimited and it
remains the duty of the federal courts to protect
the individual's constitutional rights from inva-
sion either by state action or under color
thereof. Especially is this true in the sensitive
areas of First Amendment rights and racial dis-
crimination. Where there exists the clear possi-
bility of an immediate and irreparable injury to
such rights by state legislative action the federal
courts have exercised their equitable powers in-
cluding ... injunction.
215
The court rejected the defendants' argument
that Tenney indicated immunity from suit:
"That case holds that legislators when acting
within the scope of their authority are not liable
for money damages, notwithstanding their con-
duct may have been motivated by personal spite
or vindictiveness. ' 21 6 It was not applicable to a
case in which injunctive relief was asked in or-
der to protect federal rights. In such a case,
according to the court, the federal courts have
the power to review the actions of the legisla-
ture and to grant appropriate relief. That
power cannot be limited by a claim of legislative
privilege.
Of course the Supreme Court has never been
as explicit as the Fourth Circuit on this issue.
But the fact that it has granted injunctive relief
against state legislatures and their members
with no discussion of legislative privilege when
legislative privilege stands out as a crucial issue
tempted to expand the coverage of its laws against
champerty, barratry and maintenance to include the
activities of civil rights organizations within the state.
The particular committee cited in Jordan was origi-
nally established to oversee "the laws of the Common-
wealth relating to the administration of justice ...
particularly those relating to the statutorily redefined
offenses of champerty, maintenance, etc .... "Id. at
602. Its activities were later expanded to cover legal
ethics and the unauthorized practice of law. Plaintiffs
alleged that the committee by use of its investigatory
power was interfering with their efforts as lawyers to
eliminate segregation.
214 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1970).
215 323 F.2d at 601.
216 Id. at 602.
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in similar cases at the federal congressional
level is a strong indication that the Court does
not recognize a similar privilege at both levels.
CONCLUSION
A Brief Return to the Craig Opinion
The dilemma facing the Seventh Circuit in
Craig was to determine from both the history of
legislative privilege and the relevant Supreme
Court decisions whether state legislators ac-
cused of violating federal criminal laws enjoy
some form of federal common law privilege.
Obviously, neither history nor Supreme Court
decisions provide clear guidance, and more
than one conclusion can be, and was, drawn
from the same source material. However, the
decision of the full court 2 7 seems to reflect
more accurately both the history of legislative
privilege and the principles articulated by the
Supreme Court than does the earlier panel de-
cision.
The principal difference between the panel
majority and the full court majority opinions is
one of emphasis. The panel majority relied
almost exclusively on the broad language of the
speech or debate clause cases, and it stressed
the need for legislative independence at all lev-
els of government. It argued that in a govern-
ment of limited powers - with those powers not
specifically granted the federal government re-
served to the states under the tenth amend-
ment-the states had an essential role to play in
the operation of the governmental system.
Fearing that the independence of the state leg-
islatures would be compromised if the federal
government could threaten state legislators
with criminal liability for their legislative acts,
the panel considered a broad legislative privi-
lege, equivalent to the speech or debate clause,
to be necessary in order to eliminate that poten-
tial threat.
The problem with the panel's singular em-
phasis on independence is that it ignores both
the implications of the supremacy clause and
the separation of powers function served by the
speech or debate clause at the federal level. The
concept of legislative privilege developed as a
consequence of the competition for power be-
217 All references to the full court decision in this
section specifically emcompass both Judge Tone's
concurrence in the panel decision and the full court
opinion on rehearing. The latter essentially adopted
the former.
tween the executive and legislative sections of
government. In England, it arose in the battle
for supremacy between the Crown and Parlia-
ment. In the United States, the principle was
adapted to ensure the separation and balance
of power between two equal and clearly com-
peting branches of the federal government. In
both cases it was principally the power of the
competing executive branch that the privilege
was designed to curb.
Within any federal system there is, of course,
potential for competition between the separate
levels of government, just as various branches
at the same level may compete for power. But
under the Constitution when authority is spe-
cifically delegated to the federal government,
the supremacy clause resolves the issue of com-
petition for power. Concern for the independ-
ence of a state legislature, on the other hand,
involves the relationship within the state gov-
ernment between legislative and executive
branches, a tension properly controlled by state
speech or debate privileges. Therefore, the
question that should be asked in federal prose-
cutions of state legislators is not whether the
independence of a state legislature may in some
way be affected, but whether the federal gov-
ernment has the authority to act. Whatever
questions may once have been raised with re-
spect to the federal government's authority to
act in matters of criminal law enforcement, that
federal power is now clearly established under
the commerce clause" ' and other explicit
grants of authority such as the power to estab-
lish the post office. 9 Both the Hobbs Act and
the Mail Fraud Statute under which the legisla-
tors in Craig were prosecuted have been specifi-
cally upheld against constitutional attack.
22 0
218 Cases upholding the power of the federal gov-
ernment to define and punish criminal activity under
pthe commerce clause, in conjunction with the neces-
sary and proper clause are numerous. For broad
interpretation of the reach of this power, see Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) in which the Court
upheld the constitutionality of a congressional statute
directed at "loan sharking" activities over the vigor-
ous dissent of'Justice Stewart who maintained that the
crime was purely local in nature and not within the
power of the federal government to punish.
21" For a discussion of the federal power under this
clause, see Cushman, National Police Power under the
Postal Clause of the Constitution, 4 MINN. L. REv. 402
(1920).
220 See, e.g., United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53
(1975) (Hobbs Act); United States v. Mirabelle, 503
F.2d (1065, 8th Cir. 1974) (mail fraud).
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Both these statutes have also been construed to
reach the illegal activities of state officials,
221
and there is no reason why the activities of state
legislators alone should be exempted.
In contrast to the panel decision, the full
court decision in Craig focuses not only on the
separation of powers function of the speech or
debate privilege, but also on the limitations of
both that privilege and the doctrine of official
immunity. It implicitly recognizes that inde-
pendence is not the sole factor to be considered
in determining the nature of a legislator's privi-
lege. Almost all government officials enjoy
some sort of privilege from suit premised on
their need for independence in order to carry
out their duties. But not all officials are equally
immune. The differences in protection are re-
lated both to the nature of the particular offi-
cial'sjob and to the requirements of the consti-
tutional system, requirements which vary when
the issue is not intra-federal power, but federal-
state relations.
The full court opinion also reveals a more
cautious attitude toward the creation of federal
221 See, e.g., United States v. Kuta, 518 F.2d 947 (7th
Cir. 1975) (alderman charged under Hobbs Act);
United States v. Price, 507 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974)
(chairman of county council charged under Hobbs
Act); Shusan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (1941)
(member of board of commissioners charged under
mail fraud statute).
common law privileges. Its tone recalls Wig-
more's reflections on the public's right to
"everyman's evidence. '"222
The investigation of truth and the enforcement
of testimonial duty demand the restriction, not
the expansion, of... privileges. They should be
recognized only within the narrowest limits re-
quired by principle. Every step beyond these
limits helps to provide, without any real neces-




This same philosophy is implicit in the decisions
of the Supreme Court dealing with legislative
privilege, if one considers the entire spectrum
of cases in which the Court has dealt, directly or
indirectly, with the issue. The Court has not
extended the privilege "beyond its intended
scope. 12 24 Where there is no real necessity for
an expansive interpretation of privilege, none
has been given. Similarly, the final decision of
the court in Craig recognizes that in the context
of federal criminal prosecutions of state legisla-
tors there is no necessity for an expansive inter-
pretation of legislative privilege, and none
should be given.
222 8 WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 2192 (Mc Naughten
rev. 1961).
223 Id.
224 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 516.
1977]
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
Copyright © 1977 by Northwestern University School of Law
THE RIGHT OF AUTONOMY: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMIT TO PLENARY
FEDERAL POWER
As every United States citizen ought surely to
be aware, government in this country functions
through two entities, the state and federal gov-
ernments. Since these institutions are by defini-
tion separate forms, resisting ready integration,
those regions where they interface have been in
continuous flux from before the birth of the
Constitution.' The struggle between them has
resulted in a steady erosion of the position of
the state vis-a-vis the national government as an
independent political body. 2 Indeed, since the
beginning of the Republic, an erratic but steady
decline in the power of the states has been
recognized by the courts.3 So complete is this
decline that the classic expression of the struc-
ture of state-national relations, the tenth
amendment, has been shorn of all substance
and called a mere "truism" .4 Yet, to consider
the shift of power as ended save for the even-
tual dismantlement of state governmental ma-
chinery, is to overlook both the vitality of the
Constitution as a source of preservation of state
independence and the ability of the Supreme
Court to invigorate it. While the struggle for
power has long since been decided, there now
remains the need to deal with the state's right to
autonomy5 upon which the Constitution was
I See remarks of Messrs. Patterson, Lansing, Ran-
dolph, and Hamilton, J. MADISON, NOTES OF DE-
BATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 118-39
(1966).
2 Kurland, Foreword: Equal in Origin and Equal in
Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of Govern-
ment, 78 HARV. LAW REV. 143,144 (1964) (hereinafter
cited as Kurland).
3 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793),
where the Supreme Court found that the Constitu-
tion had shorn the states of sovereign immunity from
suit and a state could thus be sued by its citizens.
I "The Amendment [the Tenth] states but a truism
that all is retained which has not been surrendered."
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,112 (1941). The
tenth amendment provides that "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
5 The labeling of this right as one of autonomy was
arbitrarily selected by the author to express the na-
ture of the purpose which it serves in the federal
system. The word was used in a related context by
Justice Field in Ex parte Virginia:
based and which is becoming increasingly ex-
plicit in the decisions of the Supreme Court.
I. HISTORY OF STATE-NATIONAL CONFRONTA-
TION OVER POWER
While the tenth amendment is not the only
marker in the Constitution concerning the rela-
tionship of state and national power, with rare
exceptions6 its language has provided the para-
digm of judicial analysis. Assuming that power
was reserved to the states or people unless a
delegation by either of those groups could be
found in the Constitution,7 the crucial question,
traditionally, was one of defining the word
"power".
Following the adoption of the Constitution, it
took only thirty years of constitutional interpre-
tation before the potential of national power
was exponentially increased. While the Articles
of Confederation had limited the national gov-
ernment solely to its "express powers," the
Constitution of 1789 contained no such limiting
Nothing, in my judgment, could have a greater
tendency to destroy the independence and au-
tonomy of the States ... than the doctrine as-
serted in this case, that Congress can exercise
coercive authority over judicial officers of the
State in the discharge of their duties under State
laws.
100 U.S. 339, 358 (1879) (Field, J., dissenting).
6 For example, Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), concerned the contract
clause, art. I, § 10.
One commentator has interpreted the tenth
amendment to mean:
The States of course possess every power that
government has ever anywhere exercised, ex-
cept only those powers which their own constitu-
tions or the Constitution of the United States
explicitly or by plain inference withhold. They
are the ordinary governments of the country;
the federal government is its instrument only for
particular purposes.
W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 184 (1908).
' Article II of the Articles of Confederation stated:
Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and
independence, and every power, jurisdiction
and right, which is not by this conference ex-
pressly delegated to the United States, in Con-
gress assembled.
Vol. 68, No. 1
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language. McCulloch v. Maryland' extended the
definition of "power" to include those powers
reasonably implied via the necessary and
proper clause of the Constitution. 0 Loss of
power by the states during this period primarily
concerned those powers outgoing in nature;
that is, powers which extended or had the po-
tential to expand a state's impact beyond its
boundaries. Thus, McCulloch circumscribed the
state's power to tax. Five years later, in Gibbons
v. Ogden," the federal commerce power 2 was
sufficient to invalidate a state's attempt to exer-
cise its police power, the classic pre-emption
case.' 3 Control of slavery, insofar as it was a
question of citizenship, was found to be beyond
the power of the states to inhibit.'
4
These pre-Civil War decisions expanded fed-
eral power at the expense of the state, but only
insofar as the state partook of activities that
might interfere with those which had been del-
egated to the national government. Within
their own realm, the states remained independ-
ent.' 5
While the Civil War answered whether the
Constitution was a dissolvable compact, its
progeny-the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fif-
teenth amendments-posed grave questions as
to the ordering of power between the state and
national governments. Now the federal govern-
9 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In McCulloch, the
Supreme Court found the states to be incapable un-
der the Constitution to tax property owned by the
national government.
10 Congress shall have Power.. to make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
the carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Con-
stitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
U.S. CO ST. art I, § 8.
11 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
'3 See Comment, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting
Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975).
14 See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539
(1842), where a Pennsylvania statute making illegal
the willful taking of people out of the state to enslave
them was found to be unconstitutional. See also, Dred
Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
"5The powers exclusively given to the federal
government are limitations upon state author-
ities. But, with the exception of these limita-
tions, the states are supreme; and their sov-
ereignty can be no more invaded by the action
of the general government, than the action of
the state governments can arrest or obstruct the
course of the national power.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 570 (1832).
ment became the guarantor of certain rights of
the people against state government intrusion
or interference. Unquestionably, federal power
had been expanded at the cost of the states.1
6
What remained to be determined was how far
that expansion reached into the states.1
7
Also during this period, the power of the
state to affect outgoing enterprises and rights
continued to be scrutinized and regulated. The
classic example of the reach of federal power is
that which traces interstate commerce. While
early restrictive distinctions denied the applica-
tion of federal power to private actions,' 8 the
restrictions proved to be little more than both-
ersome delaying actions, only postponing fed-
eral action. State power as a bar proved to be a
more effective limitation. Hammer v. Dagen-
hart'9 and the decisions which found various
New Deal acts unconstitutional20 emphasized
the continuing belief that there existed substan-
tive powers retained by the states which could
defeat otherwise legitimate national actions.
The respective reach of national and state
taxing powers continued to be a field of uncer-
tain bounds. In Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie
County ,21 following McCulloch, the states were
found to be incompetent to tax the salary of a
federal official. Conversely, in Collector v. Day, 22
the national government was denied the right
to tax the salary of a state judicial officer. Yet,
in South Carolina v. United States,23 the national
government was found to be capable of taxing
certain functions which the state had assumed
in the exercise of its police power. The sym-
metrical nature of the tax system was breaking
down, as the needs of the national government
began to take precedence.
16 "They [the XIII, XIV, and XV Amendments]
were intended to be, what they really are, limitations
of the power of the States and enlargements of the
power of the Congress." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 345 (1879).
17 The Fourteenth Amendment withdrew from
the States powers theretofore enjoyed by them
to an extent not yet fully ascertained, or rather,
to speak more accurately, limited those powers
and restrained their exercise.
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 92 (1908).
Is See, e.g, United States v. E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1
(1895).
19 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
20 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936);
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Schecter
Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
21 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842).
22 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870).
- 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
1977] AUTONOMY
COMMENTS
As to those powers and prerogatives of the
state which were internal in application, pri-
marily the police power and its concern for the
health and safety of its citizens, the entry of-
fered to the national government by the Civil
War Amendments was bitterly fought and re-
strictively perceived. While the Supreme Court
in The Slaughterhouse Cases24 recognized the
goals and reasoning of those amendments, it
refused to invigorate them.25 Indeed, in those
rare instances where the Court did act,2" the
outcry was loud and fierce. Similarly, attempts
to reach the criminal systems of the states via
incorporation of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights into the fourteenth amendment due
process provision were soundly defeated.
When the electric chair was first introduced,
attempts were made to attack it as a cruel and
unusual punishment. The Court rejected such
an approach, holding that:
The Fourteenth Amendment did not radically
change the whole theory of the relations of the
state and Federal governments to each other,
and of both governments to the people."
An attempt to incorporate the right against self-
incrimination reached a like fate. 28 Indeed, in
South Carolina v. United States, 29 the Court went
so far as to limit the federal power to intervene
within a state to the provisions of a single con-
stitutional clause,
[t]he Constitution provides that "the United
States shall guarantee to every State in this Un-
ion a republican form of government," Art. IV,
24 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
2 The dissent clearly acknowledged the course the
future would eventually take:
It [the power via the war amendments] is neces-
sary to enable the government of the Nation to
secure everyone within its jurisdiction the rights
and privileges enumerated, which, according
to the plainest considerations of reason and jus-
tice and the fundamental principles of the social
compact, all are entitled to enjoy. Without such
authority any government claiming to be na-
tional is glaringly defective.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting).26Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879). Virginia
had a statute requiring its judges to venire only re-
sponsible men. One state judge had used this formu-
lation to eliminate all blacks. In this case, the Su-
preme Court upheld federal intervention.
27 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448 (1890).
28 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
29 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
sec. 4. That expresses the full limit of National
control over the internal affairs of a State. 0
The last significant attempt to reject the ex-
panded constitutional power of the national
government came with the "infamous ' 3 1 strik-
ing down of a dozen pieces of New Deal legisla-
tion. That process came abruptly to an end in
1937, however, and the question of the distribu-
tion of power between the federal and state
governments began to be resolved.
The substantive impact of the tenth amend-
ment did not long survive the Court's turna-
bout. By 1941, the amendment reached
"truism" status,2 2 as the Supreme Court finally
decided that a plenary power of the national
government could not be buffered or moder-
ated by any powers inherent in the states. 33
There were no such powers.
The Supreme Court for the first time in-
truded in a state criminal proceeding in Powell
v. Alabama.34 The states' ability to mold and
determine their own criminal procedure began
to erode at a quickening pace in the years that
followed. The same day that an attempt to ex-
tend the fourth amendment exclusionary rule
to the states was defeated,- a confession ac-
cepted by a state supreme court 6 was thrown
out by the United States Supreme Court as
being coercively obtained in violation of the due
process provision of the fourteenth amend-
ment.37 As state criminal proceedings became
more encumbered with federal rights to pro-
tect, they became more subject to federal re-
view as to those rights.3
8
30 Id. at 454. If strictly adhered to, this would have
effectively removed state action from judicial over-
sight since the Court had held previously that art.
IV, § 4 was directed not to the judiciary, but, rather,
the Congress. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1
(1849).
31 See Blaustein & Mersky, Rating Supreme Court
Justices, 58 A.B.A. J. 1183, 1186 (1972).
32 See note 4 supra.
I Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
34 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The Court found that the
failure of the trial court to appoint counsel for the
defendant in a capital case was a violation of due
process as required by the fourteenth amendment.
" Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
36 Watts v. State, 226 Ind. 655, 82 N.E.2d 846
(1948).
27 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
31 The decision in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309
(1915), first opened federal courts for habeas corpus
review of state actions in limited circumstances.
These circumstances were progressively broadened
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The Warren Court ended judicial hesitation
in applying provisions of the Bill of Rights to
state criminal proceedings through the four-
teenth amendment. The exclusionary rule con-
cerning evidence obtained from searches and
seizures illegal under the fourth amendment
was applied to the states in 1961.39 The provi-
sions of the fifth amendment (prohibition
against double jeopardy4 and privilege against
self-incrimination 4 ) and the sixth amendment
(right to a speedy trial,42 right to counsel,
4 3
right to a jury trial for a criminal prosecution
44
and the right to confront witnesses45), as well as
the derivative protections of Miranda v. Ari-
zona,46 were held to apply to the states.
The Court has gone beyond the state's crimi-
nal processes and has extended federal power
to reach the state's power to educate its citi-
zens,4 provide recreation ,48 establish political
subdivisions49 and even constitute its own legis-
lature.50 These extensions, however, were not
based on the plenary power of the federal gov-
ernment but on the oversight responsibilities
given it by the Civil War Amendments.
As more and more constitutional safeguards
were being grafted onto the state criminal proc-
ess, there arose the notion that these rights
required a federal forum of review to ensure
their exercise and enforcement." The basic ra-
in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 391 (1953), Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963), and Kaufman v. United States,
394 U.S. 217 (1969). But, see Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976). See also, text accompanying notes
116-18 infra.
"9 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
40 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). See
also, Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
41 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
42 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
43 The right was first extended to indigent felony
defendants in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963), and to indigent misdemeanor defendants sub-
ject to incarceration in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972).
44 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
45 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
46 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See generally, Kamisar, A
Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the
"New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test,
65 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1966).
47 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
48 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Gilmore v.
City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
40 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
'o Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
" Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 58 (1971).
tionale was that a federal right was being con-
tested and that the states, which had been re-
luctant to introduce these safeguards without a
constitutional mandate, would not be reliable in
ensuring their proper breadth. The result was
the judicial extension of habeas corpus review
in federal court of state court constitutional
determinations .52
The internal structure of the state had like-
wise always been free from federal oversight.
Judicial attacks based on the Guarantee Clause
of the Constitution 3 were rebuffed on the
premise that the power to carry out the guaran-
tee of the section was legislative in nature .
4
This all changed in 1962, when Baker v. Carr55
held the principle of "one man-one vote" appli-
cable to the apportionment of state legislatures
through the Equal Protection Clause of the
fourteenth amendment.56 Three years later,
federal mandates concerning procedures to be
followed in the registration of the electorate by
the states were upheld by the Supreme Court in
Louisiana v. United States 7 and South Carolina v.
Katzenbach ." Indeed, the oversight processes
validated in Katzenbach relegated the state to the
status oT' a mere administrative unit of the na-
tional government for purposes of voter regis-
tration, as the ministerial control of the United
States Justice Department was broad in scope,
scrupulous in detail, and affirmative in nature.
These decisions mark the highwater crest of
national manipulation of state institutions. To a
large extent, the intrusion of federal policy and
power into these reaches was a response to the
inability of the state institutions to shift as
quickly as national expectations. 9 The result
was an abiding distrust in the competence of
the states to act as they "ought" and the destruc-
5 See note 38 supra.
3 "The United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a Republican Form of Government."
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
54 Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608
(1937).
55 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
56 The principle ultimately was extended to
Congressional districts. The very nature of the Senate
precluded application of such a formula to Senate
elections. For the Senate was not designed to be
representative of the population, but it was to repre-
sent the equal sovereignty of the states. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 62 (A. Hamilton).
57 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
383 U.S. 301 (1966).
9 Kurland, The Supreme Court and the Attrition of
State Power, 10 STAN. L. REV. 274, 282-283 (1958).
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tion of the ability of the states to develop their
own ordering of priorities .60 The powers relat-
ing to sovereignty-all the power which made
an institution a state-have thus come to lodge
within the national government. The states,
lacking all effective substantive power, can be
seen as mere political sub-units of the national
government. If transformation of the federal
national government into a unitary national
government has not yet occurred, the reason is
not lack of power, but lack of need or desire to
exercise that power."
There is no longer any struggle between the
state and national governments as to where the
powers lie. The delegated powers of the federal
government have become the functional equiv-
alent of all the powers:
There are today few, if any, governmental func-
tions performed by the states that are not subject
either to the direct control of the national gov-
ernment or to the possibility of preemption by
the national government. The concept of sepa-
rate sovereignties within this country is largely a
matter of history.2
Thus, between the final recognition and ac-
ceptance of the plenary nature of the delegated
powers of the national government 3 and the
60 When the state governments fail to satisfy the
needs of the people, the people appeal to the
Federal Government. Whether the question is
one of the advancement of human knowledge
through research, of law and order or the right
of all persons to equal protection of the law, the
Federal Government need become involved only
when the states fail to act.
(quoting Chief Justice Warren in A. MASON & W.
BEANEY, THE SUPREME COURT IN A FREE SOCIETY
310 (1959).)
61 Such a change may indeed be what is required in
order for the United States to respond to the require-
ments and needs of its citizens and the exigencies
generated by the international community. Yet, inso-
far as our Constitution is the law from which our
system emanates and since its integrity is crucial for
the continuing integrity of the system, the uses to
which it is put must remain in harmony with the spirit
of the document. For the states to become only inte-
grated components within a master system, without
character of their own, a constitutional amendment
should be required, not judicial fiat or legerdemain.
62 Kurland, supra note 2, at 163. All that remains to
be determined is how much power Congress cares to
exercise. See Murphy, State Sovereignty and the Consti-
tuition -A Summary View, 33 Miss. L. REV. 353, 358
(1962). See also, Kurland, supra note 2, at 144.
1 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115
(1941).
ability of the national government to set stan-
dards and conditions to which the state govern-
ments must conform, the states as institutions
have become superfluous without a visible
change in the document which they caused to
have established in the first instance. There
exists the existential dilemma of the states: all
effective power having passed from them;
what is the meaning and purpose of their exist-
ence?
II. PERCEPTIONS OF AUTONOMY
The judicial response to this judicially cre-
ated paradox has not yet been recognized for
what it is: a failure to separate the questions of
internal state power and internal state integ-
rity.6 4 Sovereignty is two-pronged in nature. It
consists of power and discretion. Power allows
the sovereign to effectuate its wishes with as
little external interference as possible. Discre-
tion is the sovereign's ability to order its priori-
ties, to determine the manner in which it will
achieve them, and to compose the nature of its
own infrastructure. 65
The battles which have taken place between
the state and federal governments have been
perceived to have been fought over power. The
resolution of this question of power was
thought to be dispositive of the question of
autonomy, but not that of the existence of state
sovereignty. The reverse is true.
The power of the states has passed irretrieva-
bly from the scene. This power is a necessary
requirement for sovereignty. Justice Douglas
misses this point when he argues in New York v.
United States6 6 that state sovereignty must exist
unless expressly given up and that until explic-
itly abandoned, it retains the strength to buffer
federal power.67 Similarly,Justice Rehnquist, in
National League of Cities v. Usery,6S rests his anal-
64 Although the language and intent of National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) is the
closest comprehension yet.
6' Discretion is the internal orientation of the state.
Thus, within constitutional parameters, the state has
the discretion to determine the rank order and distri-
bution of its resources, e.g. whether it will pursue an
expansive highway building program or pursue a
policy of fiscal restraint, or indeed, whether it will
have any policies at all. Moreover, discretion reaches
the internal structure of the state, as the state is the
determiner of how it will organize itself.
66 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
67 Id. at 594-96.
68 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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ysis on "states as states" and fails to recognize
that what he means is not state sovereignty at
all. Sovereignty in substance has been disem-
boweled by the loss of power. The response of
the South to the order for school desegregation
and the reaction of the nation to the South, in
consequence, clearly demonstrate that state
sovereignty, if it exists at all, is only a hollow
shell once power has passed.
69
However, the second of the components
which comprise state sovereignty -discretion -
has not been destroyed. Nothing in the passing
of power (except, perhaps, its coercive poten-
tial)70 has served to strip the states of their
discretion. Power is not necessary to its exer-
cise, for discretion is self-sufficient, represent-
ing the core of the spirit of the institution; it will
decide in what manner it will act, unless forced
to do otherwise. Clearly, the states will decide in
what manner they ought to act. This preroga-
tive is all that remains from their former sover-
eign status. Yet it does remain, and while, like
the prerogatives of the national government, it
must conform to certain constitutional require-
ments, it, too, is constitutional in stature and
may act to protect itself, much like the right of
privacy serves to insulate the prerogatives of
the individual. 7' The residuary discretion of the
state is the state's right of autonomy.
7 2
69 This is the question, or rather, non-question, of
interposition, the placing of a state's sovereignty be-
tween the people of the state and a federal determi-
nation. See 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 437-47; Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); Bush v. Orleans Parish
School, 364 U.S. 500 (1961) (per curiam). See also,
Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859); U.S.
v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809).
70 For example, the power of the purse, (i.e., con-
ditional spending.) See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 (1937).
71 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
72 Cf. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 323
(1934). That the right to autonomy is of constitutional
dimension ought to be without challenge. The states
formed the Constitution. The states and the people
ratified and accepted the Constitution. Its existence
was for the states' protection, not their extermina-
tion. The constitutional protections for and concern-
ing the States (art. IV); the constitutional prohibi-
tions against the states (art. I. § 10); and the nature
and responsibilities necessitated in choosing the legis-
lative (art. I, § 4 and amend. XVII) and the executive
(art. II, § 1) all require that the states retain the ability
to exercise their discretion in order to achieve or not
achieve certain ends.
In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), an
attempt by the state of Maryland to place a maximum
Justice Frankfurter in New York v. United
States73 recognized that:
There are, of course, State activities and state-
owned property that partake of uniqueness
from the point of view of intergovernmental
relations. These inherently constitute a class by
themselves. 4
These activities and properties and those al-
luded to in Chief Justice Stone's concurring
opinion75 are but a single facet of the right of
autonomy. Not only are the symbols and seat of
the state necessary to the autonomy of the state,
but the very process of decision-making by the
state is subsumed within the right. This deci-
sion-making process is the ability of the state to
determine in what areas and in what manner it
will act to serve its citizenry. This process allows
each state to retain its character, express its
values, and yet fulfill its constitutional require-
ments. Autonomy gives each state an opportu-
nity for a separate personality. While the po-
tential for separate personalities is not the goal
of the right of autonomy, it is a highly viable
means of perceiving its existence.
If taken to extreme, the right to autonomy
could just as easily destroy the national govern-
ment as the national government is currently
eviscerating the states. 76 Thus, it is a right
which must weigh against other rights and pow-
ers found in the Constitution and does not
provide the states with an absolute protection.
The right of autonomy for the states does offer
them, however, the constitutionally required
opportunity to preserve themselves.
ceiling on the benefits it distributed through its
AFDC program was upheld by the Supreme Court.
Justice Stewart's opinion for the majority character-
ized the Maryland action as a state's attempt "to rec-
oncile the demands of its needy citizens with the finite
resources available to meet those demands." Id. at
472. This ability to make such determinations, free
from unwarranted external intervention is the heart
of the discretion, the autonomy, of the states. Dan-
dridge also provides an example of the constitutional
limits of the right to autonomy. For, as the dissent
vigorously argues, the manner in which the state
exercised its discretion was a violation of the equal
protection, required by the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 508 (Marshall. J., dissenting).
7 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
74 Id. at 582.75 Id. at 587-88.
76 See South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S.
437, 454-56 (1905).
III. EMERGENCE OF THE RIGHT OF
AUTONOMY
Taxation Cases
Certainly if all the provisions of our Constitution
which limit the power of the Federal govern-
ment and reserve other power to the States are
to mean anything, they mean at least that the
States have the power to pass laws and amend
their constitutions without first sending their
officials hundred of miles away to beg Federal
authorities to approve them.
77
The taxing power is one which is concur-
rently held by the state and national govern-
ments. 78 It retains within it the greatest poten-
tial of all governmental powers for constructive
and destructive impact.79 In a non-unitary sys-
tem, such as ours, the ability of one govern-
ment to tax the corpus of the other represents a
tremendous threat to the balance upon which
that system must be based.
The traditional judicial response when one
institution attempted to tax an aspect of an-
other was to disallow the tax as a threat to
sovereign immunity, although nothing explic-
itly within the Constitution required this. Thus,
states were not allowed to tax any aspect of the
federal government. 8 This denial went so far,
at one time, as to bar state taxation of the
income of federal employees living within a
state. 1 When the occasion arose, the states were
found to enjoy reciprocal protection. 2 Reci-
procity is effective in delimiting the effects of a
concurrent power, so long as the line between
the two governments is clear. But as the distinc-
tion between nation and state in governmental
functions began to disintegrate following the
Civil War, it became increasingly more difficult
" South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 359
(1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
7'8 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
425 (1819).7
9 Id. at 427.8o Id. at 430.
8 Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842).
82 Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124
(1870).
The [national government] in its appropriate
sphere is supreme; but the States within the
limits of their powers not granted; or, in the
language of the tenth amendment, "reserved",
are as independent of the general government
as that government within its sphere is inde-
pendent of the states.
to retain a symmetry. The natural result was to
permit the national government to tax various
state actions, even if they were conducted
within the legitimate exercise of state power.
In South Carolina v. United States ,83 the federal
government attempted to tax a state monopoly
of the alcohol trade. This state creation of a
monopoly had been previously upheld by the
court as a legitimate exercise of the state's police
power. 4 At this time, the federal government
taxed every dispenser of alcoholic beverages.
Indeed, one quarter of all the income of the
federal government in 1901 came from this
tax. 5 The Court denied South Carolina immu-
nity from federal taxation, finding that such an
activity was not a traditional function of the
state and thus not deserving of the same quality
of protection. In this situation, the Court
treated the state no longer as a state, but as any
other corporation.
What was occurring was an expansion of the
federal taxing power at the cost of state inde-
pendence. 6 Thus, even if the state could show
a clearly legitimate interest and power to reach
a subject, the federal power could still reach the
same subject and control its behavior. It was
becoming the nature of the federal power to tax,
to reach all activities, even those which the state
could legitimately pursue.
8 7
The watershed on this question and the true
beginning of thoughtful, though muddled,
enunciation of the right to autonomy occurred
in the direct lineal descendent of South Carolina
v. United States, New York v. United States."' The
untoward division of the Court, occasioned by
the seriousness and haziness of the issue, added
both to a greater expression of views than had
83 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
'4 Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co., No. 1, 170 U.S.
438 (1898).
85 SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT
7, 21 (1905).
86 Indeed, every addition of power to the gen-
eral government involves a corresponding dim-
inution of the governmental powers of the
States. It is carved out of them.
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879).
87 It is no objection to the assertion of the power
to regulate interstate commerce that its exercise
is attended by the same incidents which attend
the exercise of the police power of the states.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114. See also,
New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J.).
88 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
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previously been aired and to a tendency to ob-
scure the nature of the right of autonomy.
In New York v. United States, the state of New
York was bottling and selling mineral water
obtained from Saratoga Springs, which was
owned and operated by the state. Such sales
were taxed by the federal government. The
state argued that the federal government ought
to be barred from taxing actions of a state taken
in an effort to conserve that state's natural re-
sources. The federal government contended
that the doctrine of South Carolina v. United
States was dispositive and foreclosed the state's
argument. The Court, divided 2-4-2,19 upheld
the federal government.
Justice Frankfurter wrote the "majority"
opinion of the Court.90 He felt that South Caro-
lina was dispositive. The federal taxing power
was plenary. However, he openly disliked
the state-governmental-function/state-govern-
ment-as-business distinction, feeling, rather,
that the question of limits to the congressional
taxing power was not within the Court's pur-
view, 91 so long as the tax did not discriminate
against or otherwise unfavorably single out the
state enterprise.
Chief Justice Stone wrote the "plurality"
opinion, in which Justices Reed, Murphy, and
Burton concurred. While likewise upholding
the validity of the tax as applied to New York,
the Chief Justice was not satisfied that the only
constitutionally mandated limit on the federal
taxing power was that it not discriminate
against the state. He reasoned that there were
activities and functions which were unique to
the state because of its status as a sovereign and
which were outside the reach of the federal
power:
If we are to treat as invalid, because discrimina-
tory, a tax on State activities and State owned
property that partake of uniqueness from the
point-of-view of intergovernmental relations, it
is plain that the invalidity is due wholly to the fact that
it is a State which is being taxed so as to unduly
infringe, in some manner, the performance of its func-
tions as a government which the Constitution recog-
nizes as sovereign.92 (Emphasis added)
'9 Justice Jackson did not participate.
90 Though it was presented as the majority opin-
ion, only one other Justice, Mr. Justice Rutledge,
concurred in it and even he wrote a separate opinion.
It is more aptly considered a "consensus" opinion.
91 Id. at 581-82.
92 Id. at 588.
The sale of mineral water is not this type of
governmental function, according to Justice
Stone, but he expressed his doubts as to the
constitutionality of federal taxes on "the State's
capitol, its State-house, its public school houses,
public parks, or its revenues from taxes or
school lands. '93 The important thing, accord-
ing to Justice Stone, was to limit the potential
deleterious impact of federal taxation on state
projects, thus protecting state sovereignty with-
out imposing too great a cost upon the federal
government in lost revenue.
94
In dissent, Justice Douglas, joined by Justice
Black, also rejected the view that the federal tax
power is plenary when not discriminatory. For
Justice Douglas, South Carolina was wrongly de-
cided. Rather, the appropriate test should fo-
cus on whether the activity is within the state's
power to initiate or operate. If so, it should be
beyond the reach of the federal tax power. The
mere fact that a state's activity was one in which
it attempted to make a profit or was in a field
formally reserved for private enterprise ought
not to have any bearing upon the status of the
state's tax immunity. Indeed, Justice Douglas
viewed the immunity as a crucial factor in the
continued maintenance of the federal system:
"The Constitution is a compact between sover-
eigns." 95 Consequently, to let one sovereign tax
the other's activities and projects is to relegate
the states to a servile status vis-a-vis the national
government.
They [the states) become subject to interference
and control both in the functions which they
931 Id. at 587-88.
14 Chief Justice Stone, quoting from Metcalf &
Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523-24 (1926).
But neither government may destroy the other
nor curtail in any substantial manner the exer-
cise of its powers. Hence the limitation upon the
taxing power of each, so far as it affects the
other, must receive a practical construction
which permits both to function with the mini-
mum of interference each with the other; and
that limitation cannot be so varied or extended
as seriously to impair either the taxing power of
the government imposing the tax . .. or the
appropriate exercise of the functions of the gov-
ernment affected by it.
326 U.S. at 589-90. See also, South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U.S. 437, 452 (1905).
[T]he two governments, National and state, are
each to exercise their power so as not to inter-
fere with the free and full exercise by the other
of its powers.
91326 U.S. at 592.
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exercise and the methods they employ. They
must pay the federal government for the privi-
lege of exercising the powers of sovereignty
guaranteed them by the Constitution.96
Thus, in New York v. United States, a majority
of the Supreme Court97 found, so far as the
taxing power of the federal government was
concerned, that the status of the states as sover-
eigns, implicit and interwoven within the text of
the Constitution, did operate to make a sub-
stantive limit to that power. This majority split
over both the substance of that power, in gen-
eral, and as applied to facts of the case. Beyond
the broad rule suggested by Justice Douglas
and the off-hand-examples of Chief Justice
Stone, little was said to explain the nature or
source of this implied right. Thus, wrapped in
shadowy ambiguities and acknowledged only by
its absence, the right of autonomy first ap-
peared.
The Commerce Power
Eighteen years later, in Maryland v. Wirtz,"s
an attempt was made to utilize the rough con-
cepts of state sovereignty outlined in New York
to establish a buffer against the otherwise plen-
ary power of the federal government concern-
ing interstate commerce. Congress had
amended the Fair Labor Standards Act, con-
cerning minimum wages and overtime benefits,
so that its provisions would reach any employee
at a state school or hospital, who was in a non-
executive, administrative or professional posi-
tion. On its face, the Act served only to provide
mandatory guidelines for employee treatment,
yet it actually went far in directing the distribu-
tion of limited state funds.9 9 This time, a six-
man majority found there was no implied right
protecting the states, at least insofar as the in-
terstate commerce power was concerned.' 00
Justice Harlan, writing for the majority,
found that United States v. Darby'°' laid out the
dimensions of the commerce power. Once a
96 Id.
11 This "majority" consisted of Chief Justice Stone
and the three justices concurring in his opinion and
the dissenters, Justice Black and Justice Douglas.
98 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
" Compare with Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970).
100 The Court divided 6-2, with Justices Douglas
and Stewart dissenting. Justice Marshall did not par-
ticipate.
101 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
company or institution fell reasonably within
the definition put forth within the act, it was
constitutionally subject to the regulation of the
Congress. That the company or institution was
owned by, operated by, or was an integrated
component of a state government was irrele-
vant to the exertion of federal control and
power:
If a state is engaging in economic activities that
are validly regulated by the Federal Government
when engaged in by private persons, the State
too may be forced to conform its activities to
federal regulation .102
Justice Harlan emphasized the plenary as-
pects of the commerce power and the rational-
ity of its connection to the extension of the Act
so as to reach the states, and rejected any doc-
trine forbidding or limiting federal interfer-
ence with the actions and powers of the
states .
03
Justice Douglas again took up the side of the
states. While Justice Harlan's opinion did not
even make mention of New York,'1 4 the reason-
,02 392 U.S. at 197; also
It [The Supreme Court] will not carve up the
commerce power to protect enterprises indistin-
guishable in their effect on commerce from pri-
vate businesses, simply because those enterprises
happen to be run by the States for the benefit of
their citizens.
Id. at 198-99.
"0 There is no general doctrine implied in the
Federal Constitution that the two governments,
national and state, are each to exercise its pow-
ers so as not to interfere with the free and full
exercise of the powers of the other.
Id. at 195.
For precedent Justice Harlan relied principally
upon Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946). In Case, the
price of timber had been given a ceiling by the admin-
istrator under the Emergency Price Control Act dur-
ing World War II to control product costs. The state
of Washington had certain timberlands set aside to
provide income for its schools. It sold at auction some
of these lands for a price greater than that allowed
under the Act. The Supreme Court upheld the ad-
ministrator and enjoined the sale. The Act had been
passed pursuant to the Congress' war power. Its ap-
proval is illustrative of the Court's bending to the will
of the national government in times of emergency.
See also, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944). Being concerned with the war power, it can-
not be dispositive on the reach of the commerce
power vis-a-vis the state's right to autonomy.
104 The majority did, however, find the time to
quibble over Justice Douglas's interpretation of Wick-




ing of the "majority" in that case was Justice
Douglas' keystone. He found that the threat of
extinction to state governments through unbri-
dled use of the commerce power had implica-
tion for the states every bit as lethal as the tax
power had had in New York.
Federal Oversight
Abstention by federal courts is a judicial con-
struct first given clear form in Justice Frank-
furter's opinion in Railroad Comm. of Texas v.
Pullman'0 5 in 1941. Abstention occurs when a
federal court refrains from acting on a question
over which it has jurisdiction but which
"touches upon a sensitive area of social policy
upon which the federal courts ought not to
enter unless no alternative to adjudication is
open."'0 6 Thus, federal courts of equity were
required not to act in certain cases pending
state determinations of policy. Clearly, this doc-
trine contains a good deal of deference to the
state's ability to determine policy. However, the
federal court had only to stay proceedings
pending the state determination; afterwards
the action to review in federal court remained
alive. This was equitable abstention.
The exercise of the commerce power may also
destroy state sovereignty. All activities affecting
commerce, even in the minutest degree, Wick-
ard, supra, may be regulated and controlled by
Congress....
Yet state government itself is an "enterprise"
with a very substantial effect on interstate com-
merce....
If all this can be done, then the National
Government could devour the essentials of state
sovereignty....
392 U.S. at 204-05. The majority responded that:
Neither here nor in Wickard has the Court de-
clared that Congress may use a relatively trivial
impact on commerce as an excuse for broad
general regulation of state or private activities.
The Court said only that where a general regula-
tory statute bears a substantial relation to com-
merce, the de minimis character of individual
instances arising under that statute are of no
consequence.
392 U.S. at 197 n. 27. This exchange highlights Justice
Harlan's and the majority's lack of understanding as
to the issue involved. Even if Wickard only allows an
extension of federal power to trifling situations rather
than defeat a general regulation, Wickard is only an
aftermath situation. It is the allowance of the general
regulation in all circumstances, such as the instant
case, that is the heart of the controversy. Wickard
cleans up the pieces. Maryland shatters the porcelain.
10 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
106 Id. at 498.
This principle expanded somewhat in the
years that followed, so that it reached not only
constitutional questions before state attempts at
limitation and construction, but also "unseemly
conflict between the sovereignties" and actions
which might unduly hinder state functions.
0 7
This expansion has not continued unchecked in
the recent past, however, as the current cases fit
less and less easily into the flow of the past.
With the addition of Chief Justice Burger in
1969 and Justice Blackmun to the Supreme
Court in 1970,108 the Court has moved with
rapidity', for an institution so akin to glacial
flow, to limit the encroachment of the national
government upon the states, and, if possible,
reverse it.
The new Court acted first in the area which
was least dangerous or controversial, the judi-
cial construct of abstention. In doing so, it was
able to reaffirm the integrity of the statejudicial
forums, avoid any direct Constitutional ques-
tions as to the status of the states, and restore,
somewhat, the state power to decide questions
of criminal law. Thus, in its second term, the
Burger court established the principle of feder-
alism abstention.
In Younger v. Harris,'0 9 the defendant had
been indicted for violation of the state Criminal
Syndicalism Act. Before the charge went to
trial, Harris sued in federal court to have the
act stricken down as unconstitutional. The
three-judge court struck down the act as vague
and overbroad. The Supreme Court reversed,
eight to one, without reaching the merits. The
Court found that the history of the country was
one based on a belief in the federal system.
Such a belief specifically excluded federal inter-
ference with state criminal prosecutions except
as the state government showed itself to be
incapable oflacting as it was supposed to. To
reinforce the belief that a state criminal pro-
ceeding was a just and fitting forum, the Su-
preme Court limited federal court interference
in a state criminal prosecution to cases involving
unjustified state harassment or irreparable in-
jury. The heart of this policy was the state-
national relationship of federalism, character-
ized as:
1
0 7 See generally, Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219
(1959).
108 Chief Justice Burger took the oath on June 23,
1969 and Justice Blackmun took the oath on June 9,
1970.
109 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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a system in which there is sensitivity to the legiti-
mate interests of both State and National Gov-
ernments, and in which the National Govern-
ment, anxious though it may be to vindicate and
protect federal rights and federal interests, al-
ways endeavors to do so in ways that will not
unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of
the states.110
Even Justice Douglas, the only dissenter,
does not dispute the nature of the federal rela-
tionship. However, particularly in light of his
fierce advancement of the meaning of the first
amendment safeguards,"' he continued to dis-
trust the states' ability and desire to exercise
and provide those safeguards for their citi-
zens.
1 2
Federalism abstention was, initially, an in-
strument primarily for the preservation of the
integrity of the state's criminal judicial system.
Two years later, the reach of this federalism
was extended to the executive and the legisla-
tive branches. Pennsylvania had passed a law
allowing private, sectarian schools to be reim-
bursed for certain secular educational functions
performed by them. This statute was struck
down by the Supreme Court as being violative
of the first amendment in Lemon v. Kurtzman
(I).113 Following that decision, the state reim-
bursed those schools for the secular functions
they had performed prior to the Supreme
Court's decision. The plaintiffs attacked this
action as being violative of the first amend-
ment. The Supreme Court upheld the state
action in Lemon v. Kurtzman (II).114
Among the plaintiffs attacks was that there
could be no justified reliance upon the statute
until validated by the courts. This argument
was peremptorily rejected. A sovereign govern-
ment must act as if it is sovereign." '5 Indeed, to
find otherwise would require federal approval
" Id. at 44.
... See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450
(1969). (Douglas, J., concurring)
112 In times of repression, when interests with
powerful spokesmen generate symbolic po-
groms against nonconformists, the federal judi-
ciary, charged by Congress with special vigilance
for protection of civil rights, has special respon-
sibilities to prevent an erosion of the individual's
constitutional rights.
401 U.S. at 58.
"3 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
114 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
115 "[G]overnments must act if they are to fulfill
their high responsibilities." 411 U.S. at 207.
for almost every action of state government
before it could be effectuated. To an extent,
this merely is a rephrasing of the presumption
of contsitutionality which attaches to all chal-
lenged state laws and actions. But the Court was
extending the concepts of federalism and state
autonomy from mere judicial abstention in
criminal matters. The record of the Supreme
Court in the 1970's is one of a continuing ex-
pansion of the recognition of federalism and its
substantive concerns.
The ability of the federal courts to safeguard
federal constitutional rights as against the states
was limited severely again, when the Supreme
Court decided that habeas corpus review by the
federal courts did not include questions of
fourth amendment search and seizure." 6 The
rationale for this decision was a balancing test
of competing interests. While the case seems to
be primarily an exposition on the weaknesses of
the exclusionary rule, the Court did not ulti-
mately deal with that issue' 7 and found that the
fourth amendment interests were outweighed
by the harm habeas corpus review caused the
states' criminal justice system."" The result is
premised on the ability and willingness of the
state to provide a full and fair hearing for the
defendant. Since the provisions of the fourth
amendment are constitutional in nature, they
can only be outweighed by interests which are
constitutional in quality. The counter-balance,
in this case, is the integrity of the state judicial
system. The federalism concerns first articu-
lated in Younger have now attained constitu-
tional dimensions.
The question might be raised as to how these
abstention and habeas corpus cases relate to a
state's right to autonomy. A state's right to au-
tonomy is no more plenary than any federal
power, as each retains substantive limits: due
process or equal protection, or an affirmative
constitutional prohibition, express or implied,
to name but a few. The integrity of the state's
administrative apparatus, the ways and means
that it creates, discharges, and upholds its laws,
are critical to its operation as a sovereign entity.
Any argument that such operations could be
completely free of federal oversight disap-
peared with the passage of the Civil War
Amendments. While those amendments did
116 Stone v. Powell, 427 U.S. 465 (1976).
"
7 Id. at 482, n. 17.
"
8 Id. at 491.
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not truncate the states' power, they did form
buffers and guidelines for its use. The balance
between the power of the federal government
to enforce those amendments within the states'
operations and the ability of the states to view
the guidelines without federal interference has
shifted markedly. In part, this has been the
result of the loss of state hostility to many of the
procedures and processes made mandatory.
But the substantive shift has been toward a
greater belief in the ability of the state to govern
itself and the superfluous nature of federal
oversight."'
While these may appear trivial as to the ques-
tion of an implied constitutional right, these
cases are symptomatic of a growing realization
on the part of the Supreme Court that the state
does have a substantive right of autonomy,
embedded within the fabric of the Constitution.
It is a power which not only constitutes a mate-
rial bumper to the exercise of federal power but
also may act to channel the process of the im-
plementation of individual rights, though not
the substance of those rights.
20
National League of Cities v. Usery
The most dramatic step toward recognition
of the state right of autonomy by the Supreme
Court has been the striking down of a federal
statute based upon the exercise of the com-
merce power for its undue interference with
"the States qua states". It is primarily a resusci-
tation of the plurality position by Chief Justice
Stone in New York v. United States,'2 ' but where
that decision recognized the right but upheld
the law, this one both recognizes the right and
provides it with some bite.
The federal Fair Labor Standards Act, whose
application to certain state employees had been
upheld by the Court in Maryland v. Wirtz' 2 was
9 Id. at 493.
120 It is important to recognize that the right of
autonomy for the state cannot limit the requirements
of the Civil War Amendments. Those amendments
concern the rights of individual people. Autonomy
concerns the relationship of the state and national
government. The amendments were passed to pro-
vide substantive limits on the states. The federal gov-
ernment may become involved by determining the
means of ensuring those rights, that is where the
right of autonomy may act. It may affect the means,
but never the substance of the individual rights.
121 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
122 392 U.S. 183 (1968). See text accompanying notes
126-32 supra.
amended in 1974 so as to apply to nearly all
employees of the states and their political sub-
divisions. Rejecting the authority of Maryland,
the Court, relying heavily upon Chief Justice
Stone's concurring opinion in New York, found
that in balancing the federal commerce power
against the intrusion by the statute into state
functions, the federal statute exceeded its per-
missible impact.23
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in
National League of Cities v. Usery 24 found that
the statute imposed substantial costs upon the
state and impinged upon the ability of the state
to determine the manner in which its money is
spent. 25 Clearly, these are interrelated areas.
Where an institution has only a limited income,
money which is required in one field will re-
quire diminution of expenditures in another
field. The actual question is one of disruptive-
ness to the internal operations of the state, the
state's right to be autonomous.
While this opinion could have been the plat-
form for the airing of the full considerations
making up the right to autonomy, it was not.
Indeed, the legal and constitutional analysis
was somewhat weak overall. The Court first
acknowledged the plenary nature of the inter-
state commerce power with the obligatory quo-
tations from Gibbons v. Ogden126 and Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States. 2 7 Then limits
upon that power by the provisions of the Bill of
Rights are cited. Finally, Justice Rehnquist
more or less established state sovereignty as an
admixture of the tenth amendment and the
language of Chief Justice Stone's opinion in
New York.128 These components, based upon
the indestructibility of the states, fashioned, in
the Court's judgment, the constitutional nature
of states as states. The federal power over com-
merce was found to be sufficiently outweighed
3 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976). Justice Rehnquist does not characterize his
opinion as a balancing test. Rather, he finds the rights
of the States entrenched and the federal commerce
power too little to move them. Id. at 852. How-
ever, the decision was 5-4, and Justice Blackmun,
whilejoining in the opinion of the Court, in a concur-
ring opinion, made explicit his belief that this was a
balance being drawn.
1- 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
1
2 Id. at 848.
12622 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
127 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964).
128 426 U.S. at 842-43, quoting Fry v. United States,
421 U.S. 542 (1975).
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by the burdensome costs and the impact upon
state priority-setting. Consequently, the act was
stricken down. As a post-script, the contradic-
tory holding of Maryland v. Wirtz129 was over-
ruled and the contrary dictum in California v.
United States'30 disapproved.
The heart of the decision is, simply put, that
"States as States stand on a quite different foot-
ing than an individual or a corporation when
challenging the exercise of Congress' power to
regulate commerce.''M The source of that dif-
ference is neither explained nor clarified by the
Court, however, and, it is this failure to give
fuller body to the right of autonomy which
provides the dissent with its plentiful ammuni-
tion.
In dissent, Justice Brennan reaffirms the
plenary nature of the federal commerce power.
First, he establishes the supremacy of the na-
tional government. 32 New York is distinguished
on the ground of tax immunity of the state, the
tax power being held concurrently, while com-
merce is a plenary power of the national gov-
ernment. 133 It is the Court's failure to fully
explain why states are entitled to be treated
differently than individuals, for surely the
tenth amendment language includes both the
states and the people, that must be remedied in
order to make clear the substantive nature of
the state's right. Justice Brennan's analogy to
the discredited logic of Carter v. Carter Coal
Co.' 34 and United States v. Butler 13 misses the
nature of the state's right involved here as com-
pared to the reactionary proclivities exercised
in these earlier cases. This difference is the
quality of the areas protected by the right of
autonomy, a right which Justice Rehnquist does
not however, successfully describe.
National League of Cities marks the latest stage
129 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
'30 297 U.S. 175 (1936). In California, federal safety
requirements were found to apply to a state railroad,
regardless of the reasons for state ownership.
131 426 U.S. at 854.
132 "[It] is not a controversy between equals"
when the federal government "is asserting its
sovereign power to regulate commerce....
[T]he interests of the nation are more important
than those of any State."
Id., quoting Sanitary District v. United States, 266
U.S. 405, 425-426 (1925).
'33 Yet, Justice Brennan fails to recognize that the
source of the state's tax immunity is the autonomy of
the state in the first place. See 426 U.S. at 843 n. 14.
134 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
13' 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
in the Burger Court's progress towards a sub-
stantive understanding of the position of the
states in the post-Civil War constitutional
framework. However, as the dissenting opinion
shows, it is not the bottom line which is not
understood, but the pathway which leads there.
The Supreme Court has thus far been unable
coherently to formulate and thereby recognize
the right of autonomy. This inability is to a
great extent undoubtedly reflective of the na-
tion as a whole, and shows the declining impor-
tance, power, and prestige of the states. 36 In
passively viewing the passing of the states, the
Court has removed itself from the document
which it has a duty to faithfully expound.
IV. RIGHT TO AUTONOMY
In summary, then, the Supreme Court in
National League of Cities and Stone v. Powell has
begun to recognize substantive limitations to
the exercise of federal power. As of the mo-
ment, though, it has been unable to overcome
the rhetoric and the tunnel vision of the past
and continues to deal with federal-state rela-
tions based upon the tenth amendment struc-
ture. This has caused the Court to have to
struggle unnecessarily to reach the proper con-
stitutional conclusion in some cases and, occa-
sionally, to miss it altogether.
The right to autonomy is a narrow concept.
Since it consists of only those prerogatives nec-
essarily retained by the state in order to pre-
serve the federal nature of the constitutional
system, the potential exists for a good deal of
disagreement as to where the flash point is.
Indeed, the strongest proponents of the right
disagree on a very important point of potential
application: the ability of the federal govern-
ment to ensure rights guaranteed to individuals
by the Constitution through the Bill of Rights.
This ability can be characterized as its oversight
power. It is qualitatively distinct in origin, exer-
cise, and goals from the plenary federal pow-
ers. 31 As a result of these differences, Justice
136See J. BRYCE, 1 THE AMERICAN COMMON-
WEALTH 562 (1908); Laski, The Obsolescence of Federal-
ism, 98 NEW REPUBLIC 367 (1939). See also note 62
supra.
137 The origin of the oversight power lies princi-
pally in the language of the Civil War Amendments
which are addressed primarily to the states. Its exer-
cise is as an intervenor between the state and the
individual, piercing the autonomy of the state. The
goal of the oversight power is to protect the individ-
ual from unconstitutional treatment from the states.
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Douglas found that the state's right to auton-
omy could not apply to limit the power of the
national government. 138 Conversely, Justice
Rehnquist and a majority of the current Court
have applied the right to autonomy in just such
a manner, to the detriment of the federal
power.
The right to autonomy concerns the federal
personality of the system. It deals only with the
direct federal-state relationships. Thus, where
the federal government interferes with legiti-
mate state autonomous interests, the state is
constitutionally protected. Yet such interests do
not reach to those rights, privileges, and im-
munities guaranteed to individuals by the Con-
stitution. These individual interests exist re-
gardless of the federal structure of the sys-
tem. 39
The autonomous interests of the state are
threefold: internal control, internal ordering,
and internal integrity. Internal control pertains
to the ability of the state to rank order deci-
sional priorities, to be able to decide what gets
done first. Internal ordering is the ability of the
state to determine the structure and nature of
its governmental organizations, to be able to
determine what agencies exist and in what
sense. Internal integrity describes the ability of
"' See note 112 supra.
139 That is, the various constitutional protections
guaranteed the general citizenry would be applicable
if only the states existed or if only the national gov-
ernment existed. The federal system is superfluous to
their vitality and value.
the state to protect its interests. These are the
minimum necessary for a state to retain its indi-
vidual character in a world without power. It is
the right to autonomy.
V. CONCLUSION
The government in the United States, as es-
tablished in the Constitution, is a federal sys-
tem. A federal system requires two tiers of gov-
ernment, non-wholly integrated and semi-inde-
pendent. Originally, the states were sovereign
entities. The course of constitutional interpre-
tation has succeeded in all but depriving them
of separate power, as the delegated powers of
the national government have become, effec-
tively, all powers. There is some quantum be-
low which any governmental system becomes
non-federal in nature, regardless of label. The
need to remain above that quantum is a consti-
tutional requirement, as the federal nature of
the government is constitutional in quality.
That quantum is supplied by the right of the
states to be autonomous.
The past one hundred years has been a
chronicle of the continuing eclipse of the states
in the constitutional framework, often through
the myopia of good intentions of the Supreme
Court. This eclipse has been the result of the
inability of the states to conform to constitu-
tional requirements, the increasing power and
import of the national government, and the
distaste of states' rights which has lingered from
the Civil War even until today. The Supreme
Court is only slowly recognizing both the need
and the nature of the right of autonomy.
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